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Deep Springs College offers a unique educational experience.  Founded in 
1917, the college sits on a cattle ranch and alfalfa farm in the High Desert of 
California.1  The intellectually-gifted students of Deep Springs combine rigorous 
academic study, manual labor, and self-governance to prepare for lives of 
service and leadership.2  However, bright, young high school seniors seeking the 
singular brand of liberal arts education offered by Deep Springs need not apply 
if they are women.3  Who is responsible for this policy?  It is not the overseers 
of the college, who have determined that the school should admit students of 
                                                 
 1. About Deep Springs, DEEP SPRINGS COLLEGE, http://www.deepsprings.edu/about (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Petition for Court Order Construing Trust Provisions, Or, If Necessary, Modifying 
the Trust Instrument at 3, In re L.L. Nunn Trust, No. SICVPB 12-53232 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 
2012) [hereinafter Petition], available at http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/Deep%20 
Springs’%2020Initial%20Coeducation%20Petition,%206%20Feb%202012 (explaining that Deep 
Springs has only admitted male students since it was founded). 
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both sexes.4  Instead, a California court recently enjoined the school from 
admitting female students in the first phase of lengthy litigation.5 
The court issued the injunction after rejecting the college’s argument that 
coeducation was permissible under a liberal construction of the 1923 Deed of 
Trust (the Trust) that endowed the school with a small fortune and described the 
school’s charitable purposes as being “for the education of promising young 
men.”6  Further complicating the situation, a nonprofit corporation formed in 
1967 began operating the school in 1996 after it received liquid assets and real 
property from the original trust.7  The case, therefore, raises not only a trust 
construction issue, but also issues concerning the degree to which the 
corporation is bound by the original trust instrument, and whether (if the 
corporation is bound) the trustees have established grounds for judicially 
modifying the terms of trust.  More broadly, the Deep Springs litigation raises 
the poignant question of to what degree the law should require charity managers 
to obey the precise charitable purposes historically advanced by the charities that 
they govern. 
The trustees of Deep Springs College, like directors and trustees of other 
charitable organizations, are subject to two familiar fiduciary duties:8 the duty 
                                                 
 4. See Press Release, Deep Springs College, Deep Springs College Has Decided to Admit 
Women (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/DSPressRelease 
091911.PDF (announcing that the trustees voted in favor of transitioning to a coeducational student 
body). 
 5. See Scott Jaschik, Women Blocked at Deep Springs, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 11, 2013, 
3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/01/11/judge-blocks-deep-springs-college 
-admitting-women (providing a general synopsis of the litigation). 
 6. See id. (explaining that the court granted the injunction after concluding that, under the 
terms of the 1923 trust, the school does not have the authority to admit women); see also Petition, 
supra note 3, at 2–3 (explaining the terms of the trust). 
 7. See Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Interpretation of the L.L. Nunn Trust at 2, In re L.L. 
Nunn Trust, No. SICVPB 12-53232 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.deepsprings.edu/downloads/Coeducation-Litigation/2012-10-03%20Trustees%20 
Opening%20Brief%20on%20Interpretation%20of%20the%20L.L.%20Nunn%20Trust.PDF. 
 8. An extensive academic literature discusses and analyzes regulation of charity fiduciaries 
and the duties that they owe.  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can 
Teach About Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G. 
Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A 
Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 (2008); Evelyn Brody, Agents 
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational 
Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996) [hereinafter Agents Without Principals]; Evelyn Brody, 
Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI. 
 -KENT L. REV. 641 (2005); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 
1400 (1998) [hereinafter The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law]; Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? 
Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004) 
[hereinafter Whose Public?]; Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance 
and Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093 (2001); Deborah 
A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131 (1993); 
Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance 
Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99 (2007); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable 
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Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218 (2003); Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Jonathan A. Lever, State 
Regulation of Health Care Conversions and Conversion Foundations, 9 HEALTH L. REP. 714 
(2000); Christopher W. Frost, Financing Public Health Through Nonprofit Conversion 
Foundations, 90 KY. L.J. 935 (2002); Susan N. Gary, Is it Prudent to be Responsible? The Legal 
Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J. 
L. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2011) [hereinafter Gary, Socially Responsible Investing]; Susan N. Gary, 
Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 593 (1999) [hereinafter Gary, Trust Law]; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of 
Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 
631 (1998); Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin and Trust in the 
Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2005); Henry 
Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 807 (1989); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 
129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit 
Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should 
Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2005); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable 
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227 (1999); Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for Non-Profit 
Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1 (2000); Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the 
Goose is not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley 
-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: 
The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director 
Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser 
& Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011 (2011); Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80  
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613 (2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit 
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007); John W. 
Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney General, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243 
(2004); Chris Abbinante, Comment, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations: 
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1997); Jeremy 
Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1677 (2009); Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit 
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (2003); Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the 
Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1485 (2003). 
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of loyalty9 and the duty of care10 (or prudent administration in the case of 
charitable trusts).11  The law of trusts, including charitable trusts, also generally 
                                                 
 9. Typically under state law, the extent of the duty of loyalty owed by charity fiduciaries 
depends on whether the charity is a trust or a nonprofit corporation.  State nonprofit statutes usually 
require a director of a nonprofit charitable corporation to act in “good faith” and according to what 
she believes (or reasonably believes) is in the “best interests of the corporation.”  See, e.g., CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 617.0830(1)(a), (c) (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2010); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (LexisNexis 2009); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (West 1995); 
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2012).  If the interests of a charitable nonprofit 
corporation conflict with the interests of directors and related persons, the duty of loyalty 
encourages directors to follow procedural safeguards.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE  
§ 5233(d)(2)(C) (West 1990) (precluding a claim if a majority of directors approved the transaction 
that could pose a conflict of interest, so long as the directors knew all of the material facts and the 
interested directors did not vote); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0832 (West 2013) (listing the procedural 
safeguards necessary for a nonprofit corporation’s transaction where one or more directors has a 
potential conflict of interest); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.60 (West 2010) (same); N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715(a) (McKinney 2005) (same); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 
22.230 (West 2012) (same); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60(a) (3d ed. 2009) (stating that a 
conflict-of-interest transaction is not voidable if, in relevant part, the board of directors is informed 
of the material facts relating to the conflict and a majority of disinterested directors approve the 
transaction); id. § 8.31(a)(1)(ii) (stating that an interested director incurs no liability if the 
procedures outlined in § 8.60 have been followed).  Generally, there is no outright prohibition 
against transactions between a director and the nonprofit corporation that she oversees.  However, 
in those jurisdictions that follow the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA), 
loans are prohibited between a director or officer and the corporation that she oversees or manages.  
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32(a) (1987).  An optional provision in the more 
recent Model Act generally forbids such loans.  Model Nonprofit Corp. Act 3d ed. § 8.32(a). 
  Under traditional trust law, trustees of charitable trusts are more strictly prohibited from 
engaging in self-dealing than are corporate fiduciaries.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS  
§ 78 cmt. a (2007) (“The duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to 
the standards of other fiduciary relationships.”).  The duty of loyalty “strictly prohibit[s]” the trustee 
“from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a 
conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests,” except in “discrete 
circumstances.”  Id. § 78(2). 
 10. As the duty of care is explained in the Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, 
a director must become adequately informed, devote appropriate attention to overseeing the 
charity’s affairs, and “act with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably exercise 
in a like position and under similar circumstances.”  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. 
§ 315(a)–(b) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).  Similarly, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation 
Act, in relevant part, requires a director to discharge her duties “with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”  REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2).  Under the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition, 
directors “must discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably 
believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(b).  
These standards are largely consistent with those set forth in many nonprofit corporation statutes.  
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (requiring a director to act “with such care, including 
reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0830(1)(b) (requiring a director to act “[w]ith the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances”); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C  (requiring a director to act “with such care as an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position with respect to a similar corporation organized under this chapter would 
918 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:913 
requires trustees to obey the terms of their trust.12  Essentially extending this 
trust law requirement into charitable nonprofit corporate law, some 
commentators, joined by at least one court, recognize a third distinct fiduciary 
duty owed by fiduciaries13 of charitable nonprofit corporations: the duty of 
obedience.14 
Other commentators prefer to articulate fiduciary obedience norms governing 
directors of charitable nonprofit corporations in terms of the duties of care and 
loyalty, which must be exercised in good faith.15  Indeed, the American Law 
                                                 
use under similar circumstances”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2541(1) (West 2012) (stating 
that a director must discharge her duties “with the degree of diligence, care, and skill which an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances in a like position”); N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2003) (mandating that a director “perform his 
duties. . . in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would use under similar circumstances”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (stating 
that a director must act “with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use 
under similar circumstances”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5712(a) (requiring a director to exercise 
“reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar 
circumstances”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (requiring a director to act “with 
ordinary care”). 
 11. The standards associated with the duty of care governing directors of charitable nonprofit 
corporations are similar to those found in traditional trust law’s duty of prudent administration, 
which governs fiduciaries of charitable trusts.  See Gary, Socially Responsible Investing, supra note 
8, at 117–19.  Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee is required “to administer the trust 
as a prudent person would, in light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1).  In administering the trust in compliance with this duty, 
the trustee generally must exercise “reasonable care, skill, and caution.”  Id. § 77(2). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 75–76, 88. 
 13. A charity fiduciary is one who oversees or manages a charitable entity, including a trustee 
of a charitable trust, a director of a charitable corporation, or an officer of a charitable entity.  
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS.at § 300 cmt. a. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 
(Sup. Ct. 1999) (explaining that the duty of obedience requires the board of directors to “seek to 
preserve its original mission”); VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND ET. AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW 
AND PRACTICE: WITH TAX ANALYSIS 413–14 (1997); DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: 
GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 21 (1988) (“[T]he duty of obedience requires that a director 
act with fidelity, within the bounds of the law generally, to the organization’s ‘mission,’ as 
expressed in its charter and by-laws.”); Fishman, supra note 8, at 237–39 (stating that directors of 
charitable nonprofit corporations have a duty of obedience, which “mandates that the board refrain 
from transactions and activities that are ultra vires, that is, beyond the corporation’s powers and 
purposes as expressed in its certificate of incorporation” and continuing that “a nonprofit 
corporation and its directors and officers have the responsibility to comply with the law”); Palmiter, 
supra note 8, at 466 (“The duty of obedience has a . . . pedigree in the non-profit corporation.  It is 
regularly mentioned along with the duties of care and loyalty.”).  For analyses of the scope and 
purpose of the duty of obedience, see generally Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 47–54 (2008) (exploring the depth, breadth, and length of the 
duty of obedience and its development in Anglo-American jurisprudence). 
 15. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 641 (“[T]he analytical approach of this Article, 
consistent with for-profit case law, is to treat obedience to the bounds of the law and to the 
organization’s mission as special functions of directors and officers to which general duty of care 
standards apply.”); see also Manny, supra note 8, at 20 (“There is some question as to whether [the 
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Institute’s Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations (PLNO) expressly 
declines to recognize either a distinct duty of obedience or certain limitations on 
fiduciary behavior that the duty is understood to entail.16  Perhaps reflecting the 
divergence of opinion on the merits of various obedience norms, there is no 
consensus among commentators as to which view of the duty of obedience 
commands the greater scholarly imprimatur.17 
However, deciding whether the law should articulate a distinct duty of 
obedience owed by all charity fiduciaries may be less important than identifying 
and analyzing the obedience norms that do, or should, govern charity 
fiduciaries—under whichever duty they may fall.  The law’s choice of obedience 
norms dictates how easily charity managers, such as the trustees of Deep Springs 
College, can adapt to their surroundings.  It also largely determines the degree 
to which charity fiduciaries or state actors control the operations of charitable 
entities.. 
TThis Article explores whether and how the exercise of discretion by charity 
fiduciaries in recasting a charity’s direction is, and should be, limited.  
Analyzing this basic issue raises additional, difficult inquiries: If the law does 
limit the ability of charity fiduciaries to determine the charitable paths of their 
entities, what standards govern the exercise of fiduciary discretion?  To what 
extent does , and should, the law treat fiduciaries of charitable trusts dissimilarly 
from those who govern charitable nonprofit corporations?  What role should 
governmental actors play in monitoring these decisions by charity managers?  If 
governmental actors should assume some monitoring role, should their review 
of fiduciary decisions be ex ante or ex post?  Which governmental actors should 
be involved?  Can donors and other stakeholders sufficiently protect their 
interests absent a strong supervisory role by the government? 
These questions are not simply esoteric enigmas designed to tickle the ears18 
of legal scholars.  As the Deep Springs community is well aware, these questions 
                                                 
duty of obedience] actually exists as a separate duty, or whether it is best described as an element 
of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care as applied to non-profit organizations.”).  Cf. Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 479, 491 (2010) (observing that “there is 
general agreement that charity leaders owe their organizations two duties under state laws: care and 
loyalty” and acknowledging the debate as to whether a distinct duty of obedience exists). 
 16. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS § 300 cmt. g(3); see also MARION R. 
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 226 (2004) (“To the extent the duty of obedience does not carry with it a duty to 
assure that the trust is meeting contemporaneous needs, it does not set forth an appropriate 
standard.”). 
 17. Compare Sugin, supra note 8, at 897–98 (stating that “the future of the duty of obedience 
is very much at risk” and that “[i]t is not surprising that the duty of obedience fails the popularity 
contest”), with Mayer & Wilson, supra note 15 (stating that “[t]here also appears to be an emerging 
consensus that a third duty, that of obedience, also applies” to charity fiduciaries). 
 18. The phrase alludes to 2 Timothy 4:3–4 (New American Standard) (“For the time will come 
when they will not endure sound doctrine; but wanting to have their ears tickled, they will 
920 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 62:913 
matter greatly.  Moreover, these questions are especially timely, for the law of 
obedience norms governing fiduciaries of charitable corporations is unsettled 
and in great need of refinement.19  Even the law governing trustees of charitable 
trusts, which is comparatively stable and uniform, merits reassessment once the 
meaning and purposes of obedience norms are thoroughly examined. 
To foster the development of the law governing charity fiduciaries, this 
Article presents a taxonomy of obedience norms,20 a doctrinal analysis of these 
norms, and a policy discussion to help answer these questions.  Part I explains 
the fundamental nature of obedience norms and articulates and illustrates the 
various types of obedience norms.  Parts II and III discuss legal authorities 
supporting or rejecting various obedience norms as applied to trustees of 
charitable trusts and directors of charitable nonprofit corporations, respectively.  
Part IV this Article evaluates the policy considerations that may justify one or 
more obedience norms.  Finally, by presenting an analytical series of questions, 
Part V explains how the law should develop in imposing, and declining to 
impose, obedience norms on charity fiduciaries. 
I.  OBEDIENCE NORMS EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED 
A.  The Basic Nature of Obedience Norms 
Fundamentally, an obedience norm simply requires a charity fiduciary, such 
as a director, trustee, or officer, to govern or manage her charity in compliance 
with some limitation or norm imposed on the charity’s activity.21  For example, 
a charitable organization must not undertake an illegal activity.22  By 
implication, a charity fiduciary must govern so as not to cause her charity to act 
                                                 
accumulate for themselves teachers in accordance to their own desires, and will turn away their 
ears from the truth and will turn aside to myths.”). 
 19. See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 46, 97 (stating that legal authorities are “seriously divided” 
as to whether a strong form of the duty of obedience applies in the case of charitable corporations 
and characterizing the relevant law as “a muddle”); Fremont-Smith & Lever, supra note 8, at 717 
(“In some states, the attorney general’s common law authority over healthcare conversions and 
conversion foundations is unclear, in which case legislation may indeed be needed to clarify the 
attorney general’s power.”); Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58–59 (opining that states should 
not employ a trust law approach to the management of charitable corporations and observing that 
“[m]ost state courts facing this issue today are doing so for the first time”); Harold L. Kaplan, 
Patrick S. Coffey, & Rosemary G. Feit, The “Charitable Trust” Doctrine: Lessons and Aftermath 
of Banner Health, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 3 (stating that “[t]he far-reaching impacts of 
the charitable-trust theory on the operation of nonprofit healthcare organizations . . . cannot be 
overstated” and noting that “the law remains in flux”); Manny, supra note 8, at 20 (describing the 
duty of obedience as “a rather nebulous duty to carry out the mission of the organization”). 
 20. The framework of obedience norms expounded upon in this Article appears in embryonic 
form in Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of Fiduciary Obedience Norms in Tax Laws 
Governing Charities: An Introduction to State Law Concepts and an Analysis of Their Implications 
for Federal Tax Law, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 197 (2012). 
 21. Fishman, supra note 8, at 237. 
 22. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2, & III.A. 
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illegally.23  Similarly, a charitable trustee must administer her trust in accordance 
with the terms of the trust instrument,24 and a director of a nonprofit corporation 
must govern in a manner that is consistent with the charity’s articles of 
incorporation and bylaws.25  In each case, the trustee or director must “obey” 
something: the law or the charity’s governing instrument(s).26 
B.  A Framework for Obedience Norms Explained and Illustrated 
In order to better analyze the degree to which the law should subject charity 
fiduciaries to various obedience norms, it is helpful to identify those norms that 
the law definitely imposes, and those that some might think the law does or 
should impose, on charity fiduciaries.27 
1.  The Legality Norm 
The requirement that fiduciaries ensure that their charities operate lawfully is 
referred to as the “legality norm.”  The legality norm plainly applies to both 
charitable trusts28 and charitable nonprofit corporations.29 
2.  The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm 
The dynamic charter fidelity norm requires “fiduciaries to ensure that a charity 
operates in accordance with its governing instrument” (such as a trust instrument 
or certificate of formation/articles of incorporation), including its purposes 
clause.30  The charity’s members, the fiduciaries themselves, or both acting 
together may amend the governing instrument.31  These groups may act under 
the terms of the proposed changes before receiving “ex ante substantive 
approval.”32  Ex ante substantive approval refers to approval by a governmental 
                                                 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2003). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 103–05. 
 26. See e.g., Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 44 (“Broadly construed, the duty of 
obedience expresses the obligation of nonprofit directors to observe and advance the mission of the 
charitable corporation by adhering to its purposes, usually as set forth in the entity’s articles of 
incorporation or bylaws.  However, in the few instances in which it is specifically mentioned by 
courts, it has been invoked to indicate directors’ responsibility to assure that their corporations obey 
the law and not stray from the dictates of the purposes expressed in their articles and bylaws.”); 
Mayer & Wilson, supra note 15, at 493 (“The duty of obedience, whether treated as a separate duty 
or as part of the duties of care and loyalty, requires charity leaders to ensure the charity both obeys 
applicable laws and complies with the provisions of its governing documents, including its stated 
mission.”). 
 27. While most of the concepts underlying these norms appear in statutes, case law, and legal 
commentary, the terminology in this section is largely original with the author. 
 28. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
 30. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 203, 215. 
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actor who must evaluate a proposed amendment before it is deemed legally 
effective, according to legal criteria for determining the justifiability of the 
amendment.33 
Ex ante substantive approval is distinguishable from approval based solely on 
a charity’s compliance with procedural rules for amending its governing 
instrument.  For example, an entity may amend its charter under typical state 
nonprofit corporation laws if it follows certain procedures.34  Although an 
amendment is generally not effective unless the entity observes the statutory 
procedures, the state does not normally undertake a substantive review of the 
proposed amendments under the typical statute.35  In contrast, under the common 
law of charitable trusts, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, 
deviations from the terms of trust typically require court approval.36 
3.  The Static Charter Fidelity Norm 
The “static charter fidelity norm” requires fiduciaries to “ensure that a charity 
operates in accordance with its governing instrument—as it was originally 
drafted and as it may be amended only with the [ex ante] substantive approval 
of a governmental actor.”37  It is important to note that this is the static charter 
fidelity norm, thus emphasizing that charity fiduciaries cannot unilaterally 
deviate from the terms of their charter merely by following certain procedures.  
Rather, they may amend charter purposes and act in accordance with amended 
charter terms only if a governmental actor (typically a court) authorizes such 
action after substantively reviewing the justifiability of a proposed change to the 
charity’s governing instrument.38 
The static charter fidelity norm typically governs charitable trusts.39  
Therefore, if a charitable trust is formed for the express purpose of treating 
people suffering from a particular disease, but medical advances render the 
charity’s fulfillment of this purpose impossible or impracticable, the charity’s 
trustees may petition a court in a cy pres proceeding to authorize the trust to 
                                                 
 33. Id. at 215 n.100. 
 34. See infra text accompanying note 107. 
 35. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 215 n.100 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.  
§ 4.002(a) (West 2011) (conditioning the filing of instruments on whether or not the instrument 
complies with the statutory requirements). 
 36. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 37. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203. 
 38. See id. at 203 n.28 (“Notwithstanding that this norm allows for amendments to a charity’s 
governing instrument if a governmental actor approves them, it is appropriately described as ‘static’ 
charter fidelity.  Acting alone, fiduciaries bound by this norm cannot cause the charity to deviate 
from the terms of its governing instrument.  Thus, from the perspective of fiduciaries who desire to 
amend the governing instrument but cannot obtain the necessary governmental approval to do so, 
the governing instrument is ‘static.’”). 
 39. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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fulfill a different charitable purpose.40  In such a case, the trustees are subject to 
the static charter fidelity norm because they are not authorized to alter the 
purposes of the trust without first petitioning a court. 
4.  The Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm 
The term “dynamic mission fidelity norm” reflects “a requirement that 
fiduciaries cause their charities to operate in accordance with the charities’ 
precise charitable mission(s) as the governing board expands, contracts, or 
otherwise alters the mission(s) from time to time.”41  In this context, “charitable 
mission” refers to the specific charitable objectives that a charity maintains in 
carrying out its customarily broader purposes articulated in the purposes clause 
of its governing instrument.42  For example, consider an entity organized for 
“charitable purposes,” including “the purpose of benefiting the community by 
providing health care and promoting the health” of residents of a certain 
geographic region.  Assume that the entity’s board has resolved to create and 
operate a children’s hospital in furtherance of the entity’s charter purposes.  
Operation of the children’s hospital is the mission of the entity.  Under the 
dynamic mission fidelity norm, the governing board is free to alter the mission 
of the entity over time (for example, by resolving to turn the children’s hospital 
into a general hospital), but the board must govern the entity so as to advance 
whatever mission is in place until the board has officially changed that mission. 
5.  The Historic Mission Fidelity Norm 
As an alternative to advancing the dynamic mission fidelity norm, the law 
could require fiduciaries to ensure that “their charities [] operate in accordance 
with the charities’ precise historic missions, which may be far more limited than 
the purposes for which they are expressly organized under their governing 
instruments”—the “historic mission fidelity norm.”43  Under this norm, 
deviating from the historic mission of the charity requires ex ante substantive 
approval from a governmental actor.44  Thus, consider the example of the 
children’s hospital.  If fiduciaries are bound by the historic mission fidelity 
norm, they may not turn the children’s hospital into a general hospital simply by 
resolving to do so.  Rather, they must first seek approval from an appropriate 
state official or body (most likely a court) to change the entity’s mission, even 
                                                 
 40. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that the doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation 
permit charitable trustees to deviate from the terms of the charitable trust in certain circumstances, 
but that this deviation is conditioned on court approval). 
 41. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203–04. 
 42. Id. at 202.  Distinguishing between a charity’s specific mission and its charter purposes is 
common.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 320 cmt. e; DiPietro, supra note 8, at 
121–25. 
 43. Buckles, supra note 20, at 203. 
 44. See id. at 223. 
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though the purposes articulated in the entity’s charter are plainly broad enough 
to encompass operating a general hospital. 
6.  The Charity Advancement Norm 
Perhaps the most basic obedience norm, upon which all others rest, is what 
this Article shall term the “charity advancement norm.”  As charity fiduciaries 
seek to forge a clear charitable path for their entities, their choices are 
determined in part by state law’s imposition of charter fidelity and mission 
fidelity norms.  Although there is some variance as to the specificity and 
mutability of charitable purposes vis-à-vis obedience norms, all of the norms 
require “that charity fiduciaries act so as to advance charitable purposes.”45  Each 
norm discussed requires fiduciaries to “drive” charities in a “general charitable 
direction.”46  Consequently, a constitutive norm underlying the others may be 
called the “charity advancement norm.” 
The charity advancement norm implies a restraint, which prohibits charity 
fiduciaries from primarily advancing a non-charitable purpose. 47  The restraint 
is simply the negative corollary of the norm itself.  The negative corollary of the 
charity advancement norm, like the norm proper, is constitutive of other 
obedience norms.  A course of action by charity fiduciaries that violates the 
negative corollary of the charity advancement norm would generally also betray 
the other obedience norms identified in this Article, such as the dynamic charter 
fidelity, static charter fidelity, historic mission fidelity, and dynamic mission 
fidelity norms.48  Furthermore, the negative corollary of the charity advancement 
norm and the legality norm reinforce one another, because operating illegally is 
generally inconsistent with advancing only charitable purposes.49 
                                                 
 45. Id. at 212. 
 46. Id.  There are two elements of the charity advancement norm.  Id. at 212 n.90.  First, 
charity fiduciaries must “cause the charity to advance a purpose” (the element of “propelling”).  Id.  
Second, charity fiduciaries must ensure that the purpose advanced by the charity is, in fact, 
charitable (the element of “steering”).  Id. 
 47. Id.  Cf. Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2011) (“To be a charity, an organization must pursue a charitable mission as its dominant and 
overriding purpose.”). 
 48. Buckles, supra note 20, at 213.  However, truly minimal advancement of a  
non–charitable purpose does not necessarily negate adherence to obedience norms.  Cf. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1) (2008) (stating that an organization is not operated exclusively for tax–
exempt purposes under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code “if more than an insubstantial 
part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose”). 
 49. Buckles, supra note 20, at 213. 
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C.  Contexts for Applying Obedience Norms 
Obedience norms apply in a variety of circumstances.  The following 
discussion identifies several of these contexts.50 
1.  Daily Operations 
Obedience norms limit the options available to fiduciaries as they oversee  
the charity’s routine operations.51  For example, the legality norm requires 
fiduciaries to manage the charity so as to ensure that it operates lawfully.52  
Similarly, charter fidelity norms constrain charitable choices contemplated by 
charity managers, and mission fidelity norms prevent a charity from straying 
from a pre-approved charitable pathway as it conducts daily operations. 
Certain obedience norms not only preclude charity managers from advancing 
illegitimate purposes, but also require them to act positively.53  For example, the 
charity advancement norm requires fiduciaries to oversee the charity’s 
operations to ensure that it indeed serves a charitable purpose.54  The charter 
fidelity norms can be understood to impose a duty on charity managers to 
manage their charity so that it actually fulfills the purposes set forth in its 
charter.55  Similarly, the mission fidelity norms may be seen as requiring charity 
fiduciaries to ensure that their charity carries out its specific charitable mission.56 
2.  Formal Amendments to Charter 
A state’s choice between the two charter fidelity norms determines the ease 
with which a charity can amend its governing instrument.57  Under the dynamic 
charter fidelity norm, a charity can amend its governing instrument, including 
its purposes clause, much more easily than a charity constrained by the static 
charter fidelity norm.  Under the latter, fiduciaries who wish to change the terms 
of the charity’s governing instrument must first receive permission from a 
governmental actor, such as a court—permission that may be granted only after 
the governmental actor has reviewed the justifiability of the change.  The 
                                                 
 50. These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive.  Other contexts requiring a choice of 
obedience norms include dispositions of a significant portion of an institution’s assets, and 
corporate combinations,such as mergers. 
 51. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 212 (explaining ways in which the various norms might 
constrain directors of a charity). 
 52. Id. at 203. 
 53. See id. at 212–13 (noting that several norms share the requirement that charity fiduciaries 
must “propel” the charity “in a general charitable direction”). 
 54. See supra Part I.B.6. 
 55. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 n.17 (Del. 1991) (referring to “the special 
duty of the fiduciaries of a charitable corporation to protect and advance its charitable purpose”). 
 56. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 8, at 904–05 (advocating for the adoption of a legal 
requirement that directors seek to follow and carry out the charitable mission of the organization, 
even when contrary to the original statements in the organization’s charter). 
 57. For a discussion of statutory law specifically addressing this issue, see infra Part III.B.2. 
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dynamic charter fidelity norm, in contrast, allows fiduciaries to amend the 
charity’s charter without first submitting the change to state actors for 
substantive review.58 
3.  Use of Funds to Further Post-Amendment Charter Purposes or a New 
Mission 
Changes to a charity’s purposes clause and modifications to a charity’s 
mission present a very interesting legal issue: May funds held by the charity 
prior to the change in charter purposes (or mission) be used to further the 
charity’s new charter purposes (or new mission)?59  To articulate this issue is to 
recognize that the choice of charter fidelity norm, as well as the choice of 
mission fidelity norm, affects much more than merely the method by which 
charity fiduciaries can initiate changes to the charity’s formal purposes and 
mission. 
To illustrate, assume that the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs formal 
amendments to a charity’s governing instrument.  Under this norm, as long as 
the charity’s governing board follows the procedures set forth in state statutory 
law, the board is free to alter the express purposes for which the charity is 
organized.  However, that the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs the 
charity’s formal ability to amend its charter does not necessarily mandate that 
the dynamic charter fidelity norm governs the charity’s ability to use  
pre-amendment assets to further post-amendment purposes.  Conceivably, state 
law could instead apply the static charter fidelity norm to the  
post-charter-amendment use of assets held before the charter amendment.60  
Similarly, a legal question arises as to whether the charity can devote assets held 
prior to the change in mission to advance its new mission, even if a formal 
charter amendment is not necessary when the governing board changes the 
charity’s mission.  The charity would not be free to do so if the historic mission 
fidelity norm, rather than the dynamic mission fidelity norm, governs the use of 
assets held prior to the change in mission.61 
                                                 
 58. See supra Part I.B.2.  As observed previously, state laws imposing merely procedural 
requirements for amending a charter, such as those mandating advance notice of proposed 
amendments to those with voting privileges and those requiring that resolutions adopting 
amendments be filed with state agencies, involve no substantive review by state actors and are 
therefore consistent with the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  Id. 
 59. See infra Part III.B.3. (providing a discussion of legal authorities specifically addressing 
this issue). 
 60. See e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (applying 
the dynamic charter fidelity norm to the organization’s amendment to its charter but strongly 
suggesting in dicta that the static charter fidelity norm should apply to the post-charter 
-amendment use of the assets the organization held before the amendment to the charter). 
 61. See supra Part I.B.5. (explaining that, under the historic mission fidelity norm, deviating 
from the historic mission of the charity requires ex ante substantive approval from a governmental 
actor). 
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4.  Distributions in Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charity 
A related issue is whether a charity seeking to dissolve itself may, pursuant to 
a plan of dissolution, transfer its assets to another charity with a mission different 
from that in its own charter.62  If the state statute governing distributions in 
dissolution expressly requires the dissolving entity to transfer its assets to other 
charities with purposes similar to the longstanding express purposes of the 
dissolving entity,63 the statute at least partially embraces the static charter 
fidelity norm.  The transferee must devote assets received from the dissolving 
entity in accordance with the transferee’s charter—one that sets forth purposes 
similar to those of the dissolving entity’s charter.  In effect, because the two 
entities have similar charter purposes, such a state statute requires vicarious 
fidelity to the dissolved entity’s charter. 
If, however, the state statute does not explicitly require a dissolving entity to 
distribute assets to only charitable transferees with similar purposes,64 the state 
courts must decide whether to employ common law trust concepts to compel 
such a result.  To empower directors to authorize distributions in dissolution to 
a charity with purposes dissimilar to those of the dissolving charity effectively 
enables directors to select new charter terms that will govern distributed assets.  
Hence, directors with such authority are functioning under the dynamic charter 
fidelity norm.  In contrast, if the courts require the dissolving entity to distribute 
assets to a charity with a similar purpose, the courts, in part, embrace the static 
charter fidelity norm in the context of dissolution and liquidation.65  Similarly, 
if courts specifically require the transferee entity to operate similarly to the 
liquidating entity, the court embraces the historic mission fidelity norm. 
D.  Co-Existence of Obedience Norms 
Some of these obedience norms can co-exist together, while others are 
incompatible.66  The legality norm is consistent to some degree with every other 
norm, although it establishes boundaries for a charity’s express charter purposes 
and mission.  The dynamic charter fidelity norm and the static charter fidelity 
norm are mutually exclusive in any single context, as are the historic mission 
fidelity norm and the dynamic mission fidelity norm. 
However, to embrace one of the charter norms to the exclusion of the other 
does not necessarily require one to adopt its most analogous mission fidelity 
norm.  Thus, theoretically, a state that has adopted the static charter fidelity norm 
need not necessarily adopt the historic mission fidelity norm.  A charity’s 
                                                 
 62. See infra Part III.B.4. (discussing case law specifically addressing this issue). 
 63. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1002-a(c)(1) (McKinney 2013) (requiring 
that corporate assets be transferred to an organization “engaged in activities substantially similar to 
those of the dissolved corporation”). 
 64. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.304(a)(2) (West 2012). 
 65. Buckles, supra note 20, at 208–09. 
 66. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 212. 
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proposed change in mission may be quite consistent with broadly-phrased 
charter purposes.  The static charter fidelity norm limits the range of options 
available to directors seeking to alter a charity’s mission, but it does not literally 
compel adherence to any specific mission.67  In contrast, to embrace the dynamic 
charter fidelity norm in one context virtually requires rejection of the historic 
mission fidelity norm in the same context.  For example, if directors are duty-
bound to follow the charity’s historic mission after a charter amendment to grant 
them formal authority to amend general charter purposes seems rather pointless. 
Finally, norms that are mutually exclusive in the same context are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive when applied in different contexts.  Thus, one 
theoretically could embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm in the context of 
formally approving charter amendments, but favor the static charter fidelity 
norm as applied to the post-amendment use of funds held by the charity both 
before and after the amendment, or as applied to distributions in liquidation of 
the charity. 
II.  OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING TRUSTEES OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
A.  Trust Law in General 
From the perspective of trustees, the law of private trusts largely subsumes 
the norm of static charter fidelity, circumscribed by the legality norm. 
1.  The Charter Fidelity Norm Under General Trust Law 
Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee “has a duty to administer 
the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of trust and 
applicable law.”68  The official Comment to the Restatement refers to the duty 
as “[t]he normal duty of a trustee to obey the terms of trust.”69  Although a trust 
can often be amended with the consent of all beneficiaries (or, in some cases, 
with the consent of the beneficiaries and the settlor),70 a trustee who believes an 
amendment is prudent generally may not unilaterally amend the trust instrument 
absent explicit authority in the trust instrument to do so.71  A petition for judicial 
modification of the trust must be filed, and relief is available only in limited 
circumstances.72  To require a trustee to obey the terms of trust is, of course, to 
                                                 
 67. Id.  In general, “[t]his conclusion holds unless the charter purposes are so detailed that 
they effectively define the specific mission of the charity.”  Id. at 212 n.88. 
 68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007). 
 69. Id. § 76, cmt. b(1). 
 70. See, e.g, id. § 65(1) (permitting modification of the trust with the consent of all 
beneficiaries). 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 64(1) (allowing a trustee to modify the terms of trust only as granted by the 
trust itself). 
 72. See id. § 66(2) (noting that the trustee must petition the court to deviate from or modify 
the terms of trust); see also, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-26(a) (LexisNexis 2011); PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 7740.2 (West 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054 (West 2007). 
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require “charter fidelity.”  Further, to permit trustees to act contrary to those 
terms only by petitioning a court to authorize a trust amendment is to embrace 
the static charter fidelity norm. 
2.  The Legality Norm 
The law of trusts also embraces the legality norm by invalidating trust terms 
that are illegal or contrary to public policy.73  Moreover, a trustee is not under a 
duty to comply with a trust provision that is unlawful or contrary to public 
policy; indeed, the trustee is generally under a duty not to comply with such a 
provision.74 
B.  Charitable Trust Law 
1.  The Charity Advancement Norm 
Trust law permits the creation of charitable trusts, which, unlike private trusts, 
are not formed primarily to benefit identified or ascertainable beneficiaries.75  A 
trust’s purpose is considered charitable “if its accomplishment is of such social 
interest or benefit to the community as to justify permitting the property to be 
devoted to the purpose in perpetuity and to justify the various other special 
privileges that are typically allowed to charitable trusts.”76  A trust can be 
“charitable” even if it does not designate a particular charitable purpose or mode 
for achieving charitable purposes.77  Thus, a trust organized simply for 
“charitable purposes” is a charitable trust.78 
Almost tautologically, to require a trustee to administer a “charitable” trust 
according to its terms is to implement the charity advancement norm.  Charitable 
trusts are accorded special treatment in virtue of their “charitable purposes” 
expressed in the terms of trust, according to which trustees must administer their 
trusts.79  Therefore, to require a trustee to administer a charitable trust according 
to its terms is to compel adherence to the charity advancement norm. 
                                                 
 73. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(a) (stating that a trust or trust provision 
is invalid if “its purpose is unlawful or its performance calls for the commission of a criminal or 
tortious act”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (1959) (“An intended trust or a provision 
in the terms of a trust is invalid if illegal.”); id. § 61 (“An intended trust or a provision in the terms 
of trust is invalid if the performance of the trust or of the provision involves the commission of a 
criminal or tortious act by the trustee.”). 
 74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 72 cmts. a–b. 
 75. See id. §§27–28 (noting that trusts can be formed either for charitable or private purposes, 
and providing a list of acceptable charitable purposes). 
 76. Id. § 28 cmt. a. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. (explaining that charitable trusts are “favored” in various ways). 
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2.  Cy Pres, Equitable Deviation, the Legality Norm, and the Static Charter 
Fidelity Norm 
Charitable trusts are also governed by the legality and static charter fidelity 
norms.  The terms of charitable trusts, like other trusts, must not be unlawful,80 
and their trustees generally must obey lawful trust terms.81  The law of charitable 
trusts also embraces both the legality and static charter fidelity norms through 
the doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation.  The doctrine of cy pres allows 
trustees to deviate from the dispositive terms of a charitable trust only in limited 
circumstances, and only with advance judicial approval.82  Under the traditional 
doctrine of cy pres, a court may direct charity fiduciaries to apply charitable trust 
funds to purposes similar to the original trust purposes if accomplishing the 
original purposes becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal, as long as the 
transferor of the funds has manifested an intent to devote the funds to charitable 
purposes more general than the frustrated specific charitable purpose.83  The 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code generally follows the 
traditional doctrine of cy pres, but adds wastefulness to the grounds for applying 
the doctrine and presumes that a donor possesses general charitable intent.84 
                                                 
 80. Id. § 28 cmt. f. 
 81. See id. § 76 (imposing a general duty on all trustees to administer the trust according to 
its terms and the law); see also id. § 76 cmt. b(1) (stating that this duty applies when the terms of 
trust have been reformed or modified under section 67 of the Restatement, which applies only to 
charitable trusts). 
 82. See id. § 67 (stating that if a charitable trust “becomes unlawful, impossible or impractical 
to carry out . . . or to the extent it is or becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated 
purpose . . . then a court will direct application of [trust] property or appropriate portion thereof to 
a charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose”); AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET 
AL., 6 SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 39.5.2 (5th ed. 2009) (stating that cy pres may be applied 
when it “is unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful to carry out” the settlor’s particular 
charitable purposes). 
 83. Sharpless v. Medford Monthly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of Friends, 548 A.2d 1157, 
1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).  Cf. 
RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 438 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that the doctrine applies when, in relevant part, 
furthering the charitable use intended by the donor “is or becomes impossible or impractical”); id. 
§ 436 (“The courts that have applied judicial cy pres to a charitable trust have usually required that 
the settlor have exhibited a general or broad charitable intent in addition to the particular purpose 
served by that trust.”); SCOTT, supra note 82 (stating that a court may apply cy pres when it “is 
unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful” to fulfill the settlor’s particular charitable 
purposes).  Some sources articulate the doctrine as involving three prongs: (1) the settlor 
gratuitously transferred property in trust for a designated charitable purpose; (2) carrying out the 
designated purposes of the gift is, or becomes, impossible, impracticable, or illegal; and (3) the 
trustor manifested a general intention to devote the gifted property to charitable purposes.  See 15 
AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 146 (2011).  See generally SCOTT, supra note 82, § 39.5 (discussing the 
cy pres doctrine). 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 & cmt. b (2003) (describing the modern rule 
as “displacing the traditional quest for a settlor’s ‘general charitable intent’ when the trust” is silent 
on the issue); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 & cmt. (2010) (explaining that modern doctrine differs 
from the traditional doctrine in that it presumes that the donor possessed a general charitable intent). 
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Closely related to the doctrine of cy pres is the doctrine of deviation (or 
“equitable deviation”).  This latter doctrine empowers a court to direct a trustee 
of a charitable trust to deviate from the administrative terms of a trust if 
compliance with the original terms is impossible or illegal, or if compliance with 
the terms of trust would substantially impede the accomplishment of trust 
purposes on account of circumstances that the settlor did not foresee.85 
In summary, unless the original charitable purposes fail on account of 
illegality, impossibility, impracticability, or wastefulness, trustees of charitable 
trusts must obey the express charitable purposes for which the settlor created the 
trust.  Further, if the trustees believe that the grounds for applying cy pres exist, 
they must petition a court before straying from the express terms of trust.  A 
similar rule applies if trustees wish to depart from the administrative terms of 
trust.  The default rules governing charitable trusts thereby adopt a strong form 
of the static charter fidelity norm, as limited by the legality norm. 
3.  Mission Fidelity 
The common law of charitable trusts does not appear to articulate any mission 
fidelity norm that is distinct from static charter fidelity.  Of course, the trustees 
of a charitable trust are generally bound by the terms of trust, as expressed in the 
trust instrument.  A charitable trust may be drafted so as to articulate a very 
specific charitable purpose, one that might qualify as a charitable “mission,” as 
the term is commonly employed.  A trustee desiring to alter that specific mission 
must petition a court in cy pres proceedings and establish the grounds for 
applying the doctrine.86  The salient fact is that any such action is necessary only 
when the charitable “mission” is articulated in the trust instrument.  The doctrine 
of cy pres applies only when “property is placed in trust to be applied to a 
designated charitable purpose.”87  If no “designated” charitable purpose fails, 
there is no basis for petitioning a court to amend the terms of the charitable trust.  
Accordingly, the common law doctrine of cy pres does not contemplate judicial 
scrutiny of mere changes in charitable mission that fall within the scope of broad 
charitable purposes articulated in the trust instrument. 
                                                 
 85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) & cmt. c (expanding the doctrine to 
authorize deviation from terms that are not merely administrative); see, e.g., MacCurdy-Salisbury 
Educ. Fund v. Killian, 309 A.2d 11, 13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973) (applying the doctrine of 
deviation to minimize adverse federal excise tax consequences of accumulating trust income). 
 86. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). 
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III.  OBEDIENCE NORMS GOVERNING DIRECTORS OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT 
CORPORATIONS 
The typical nonprofit corporation statute imposes no express “duty of 
obedience” on directors of charitable nonprofit corporations.88  Nonetheless, 
state nonprofit laws embrace a variety of obedience norms.   
A.  The Legality Norm 
Nonprofit corporations, like other entities, are typically required to act in 
accordance with the law.89  Fiduciaries who deliberately cause an entity to act 
unlawfully would presumably breach their statutory fiduciary duties.90  
Consequently, state corporation laws embrace the legality norm. 
B.  Charter Fidelity Norms 
1.  In General 
State nonprofit corporation laws also adopt norms of charter fidelity.  
Directors of a nonprofit charitable corporation must not cause the entity they 
govern to act contrary to its corporate purposes.91  Accordingly, under the 1987 
                                                 
 88. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2013) (setting forth fiduciary standards 
governing directors); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0830 (1) (West 2007) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2010) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2541 (West 2012) (same); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (LexisNexis 2009) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
5712(a) (West 1995) (same). 
 89. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.003(1)(A) (West 2012) (stating that a domestic 
entity may not take part in an “activity that is expressly unlawful or prohibited by a law of this 
state”).  Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE  § 7111 (West 2013) (stating that a corporation may be formed “for 
any lawful purpose”); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-825 (2011) (stating that a Virginia nonstock 
corporation generally “has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity”). 
 90. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.113(a) (West 2012) (stating that the statutory section 
specifying a domestic entity’s powers “does not authorize . . . a managerial official of a domestic 
entity to exercise a power in a manner inconsistent with a limitation on the purposes or powers of 
the entity contained in . . . this code, or other law of this state”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“A failure to act in good faith may be shown 
 . . .  where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law. . . .”); In re Caremark 
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating, in the context of a dispute 
involving a for-profit corporation, that “a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good 
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is 
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render 
a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards”). 
 91. Cf., e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.113(a) (2012) (stating that the statutory section 
specifying a domestic entity’s powers “does not authorize . . . a managerial official of a domestic 
entity to exercise a power in a manner inconsistent with a limitation on the purposes or powers of 
the entity contained in its governing documents”).  Thus, in Texas, the state attorney general may 
sue to enjoin any such action, and a corporation may sue a director who causes a corporation to act 
outside of its corporate purposes.  Id. § 20.002(c)(2), (c)(3)(B).  Ohio law provides similarly.  See 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.12(I)(1)(a)–(b) (2013) (permitting the state to bring an action against 
the corporation, or permitting the corporation to bring suit against a member, officer, or director). 
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Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) and the more recent 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, Third Edition (MNCA Third), certain 
lawsuits are contemplated when a corporation is alleged to have acted outside of 
its powers.92  Therefore, both model acts implicitly require directors to obey their 
corporate charters.93 
Some authorities have also recognized a positive duty imposed on directors to 
advance the charitable purposes of the corporations they oversee.94  A question 
that arises is whether this duty is better expressed in terms of the dynamic charter 
fidelity norm or the static charter fidelity norm. 
2.  The Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm Predominates in the Context of 
Formal Adoption of Charter Amendments 
State nonprofit corporation statutes typically permit amendments to corporate 
charters, including purposes clauses, as long as the entity follows the proper 
internal procedures.95  In other words, the typical nonprofit corporation statute 
does not forbid members or directors from changing the historic charter purposes 
of an incorporated charity.96  Thus, state nonprofit corporation statutes 
commonly appear to embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied to the 
formal requirements for amending a corporate charter.97 
Like many states, the PLNO embraces the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  
Under the PLNO, a charity fiduciary must cause the charity to obey the law and 
charter purposes, but fiduciaries are free to amend the entity’s charter purposes 
                                                 
 92. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. 
ACT 3d § 3.04. 
 93. See Fishman, supra note 8, at 237 (explaining that directors must abide by the 
organization’s governing documents). 
 94. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(E) (“[A] director shall consider the purposes 
of the corporation . . . .”); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 n.17 (Del. 1991) (referring to “the 
special duty of the fiduciaries of a charitable corporation to protect and advance its charitable 
purpose”); id. at 472–73 (stating that fiduciaries of a charitable corporation “have a special duty to 
advance its charitable goals”). 
 95. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5810–5817 (West 2013) (specifying procedures to amend 
a charitable nonprofit’s articles of incorporation); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.105 
(specifying procedures for amending the certificate of formation for a corporation with members 
who have voting rights); id. § 22.106 (specifying procedures for amending the certificate of 
formation for a corporation whose management is vested in its members); id. § 22.107 (specifying 
procedures for amending the certificate of formation by the board of directors). 
 96. See Katz, supra note 8, at 696–97 (noting that the boards of charitable corporations have 
broad authority to change the corporation’s purpose). 
 97. New York law is an exception.  In New York, amendments to the purposes clause in a 
charity’s corporate charter require judicial approval.  See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 
§ 804(a)(ii) (McKinney 2013) (requiring further that the state attorney general receive ten days’ 
written notice of an application for judicial approval of the charter amendment).  Accordingly, New 
York implements the static charter fidelity norm. 
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in accordance with the procedures set forth by state laws governing 
amendments.98  The comments to the PLNO state: 
Some commentators place the obligation to obey the law and the 
organizational documents and policies under a third duty unique to 
charity fiduciaries—the ‘duty of obedience.’  Substantively, to these 
commentators, such a duty embraces a faithfulness to the purposes of 
the charity.  These Principles, however, do not employ the 
terminology of a duty of obedience.  While the members of the 
governing board must adhere to the organizational documents, they 
also have the obligation to keep the purpose of the charity current and 
useful.  Accordingly, the board must amend the stated purposes when 
necessary and appropriate to do so, in accordance with the law and the 
existing organizational documents.99 
The RMNCA and the MNCA Third likewise permit a nonprofit corporation 
to amend its articles of incorporation by following certain procedures, without 
needing to petition a court.100 
3.  What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Use of Assets Held Before and 
After a Charter Amendment? 
An issue that tests the bounds of obedience norms is whether a charity may 
use assets held prior to a charter amendment—as well as substitutes or 
replacements for those assets—to fulfill post-amendment purposes.  A state law 
prohibiting a charity from using its assets (and replacements thereof) held prior 
to the charter amendment to advance post-amendment purposes implements the 
static charter fidelity norm as to the management of pre-amendment funds and 
their substitutes.101 
a.  The PLNO and Model Nonprofit Corporation Acts 
Legal reform efforts have produced mixed results in offering guidance on this 
issue.  The PLNO features the greatest clarity, providing that, if charter purposes 
are amended, general, unrestricted funds held by the charity may be used to 
advance post-amendment purposes.102  The PLNO thereby embraces the 
dynamic charter fidelity norm in this context. 
Model nonprofit corporate statutes are less definitive.  Under the 1987 
RMNCA and the more recent MNCA 3rd ed., “obedience” to the corporate 
                                                 
 98. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 300 cmt. g(3). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 10.01–.31 (explaining the amendment 
process and requirements); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 3d §§ 10.01–10.09 (same). 
 101. Even if the charity can formally amend its charter purposes without first receiving 
governmental approval of the amendment, a state law that requires charity managers to employ 
funds held prior to the charter amendment to fulfill pre-amendment purposes effectively embraces 
the static charter fidelity norm as to the management of those assets. 
 102. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 245 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005). 
2013] Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and the Duty of Obedience 935 
charter does not foreclose amendments to charter purposes.103  However, each 
act does contemplate limitations on a corporation’s ability to redeploy funds 
from their originally intended uses following an amendment of charter 
purposes.104  The 1987 RMNCA states that a charter amendment does not affect 
“any requirement or limitation imposed upon the corporation or any property 
held by it by virtue of any trust upon which such property is held by the 
corporation.”105  As discussed below, some courts characterize donated assets 
held by a charitable corporation as funds impressed with a trust.106  The 1987 
RMNCA does not explicitly state whether an otherwise unrestricted gift to a 
charitable corporation is impressed with a charitable trust governed by its charter 
purposes at the time of the gift,107 and the MNCA Third is arguably even more 
ambiguous.108 
b.  Case Law Supporting the Static Charter Fidelity Norm 
Contrary to the rule embraced by the PLNO, some cases implement the static 
charter fidelity norm as applied to the post-amendment use of funds held before 
and after a charter amendment.  An illustrative case is In re Manhattan Eye, Ear 
& Throat Hospital v. Spitzer, in which a charitable corporation operating an 
acute care specialty teaching hospital proposed to sell its facility and use the 
                                                 
 103. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 10.01–.31; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. 
ACT 3d §§ 10.01–10.09. 
 104. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.08; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 3d 
§ 10.09. 
 105. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.08.  Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5820(a) (West 
1990) (“Amendment of the articles of a corporation, pursuant to this chapter, does not, of itself, 
abrogate any requirement or limitation imposed upon the corporation, or any property held by it, 
by virtue of the trust under which such property is held by the corporation.”). 
 106. See infra text accompanying notes 150–65.  But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS  
§ 28 cmt. a (2007) (stating that a gift to a charitable corporation for its general purposes does not 
create a trust). 
 107. One commentator argues that the RMNCA “nowhere requires the use of general funds for 
pre-amendment purposes only.”  Katz, supra note 8, at 697.  This reading of the RMNCA assumes 
that charter purposes do not impress general corporate funds with a “trust” within the meaning of 
section 10.08.  Another commentator takes a contrary view of the RMNCA.  See Iris J. Goodwin, 
Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1093, 1135 (2005) (“Although some states may accord directors a measure of autonomy in 
interpreting the charity’s mission, the commissioners who drafted the Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act were ultimately uncomfortable with the idea of allowing a corporate charity to 
alter its purposes without applying to court for cy pres relief. . . .”).  The comments to the RMNCA 
are ambiguous.  See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT  
§ 2.02 cmt. 3(a) (“By irrevocably dedicating assets when such dedication is not required, the 
incorporators may inadvertently impress the assets of a corporation with unintended restrictions 
and obligations.”); see also Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58 (“[T]he Act suggests the 
possibility that the corporation, as distinct from the director, may continue to be subject to state 
common law that applies trust rules to the property held by the nonprofit corporation.”) (citing 
RMNCA § 8.30 cmt. 1). 
 108. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 210 (discussing whether the static charter fidelity norm 
applies under the MNCA Third, and determining that the statute “punts on the issue”). 
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proceeds to support free-standing diagnostic and treatment centers in poor 
neighborhoods.109  Realizing that this course of action would require an 
amendment to the hospital’s certificate of incorporation, the hospital’s 
governing board authorized, but did not formally adopt, the required 
amendment.110  The proposed sale of substantially all of the hospital’s assets 
required judicial approval under state law.111  The relevant statute required the 
hospital to establish that “the consideration and the terms of the [transaction] are 
fair and reasonable to the corporation, and that the purposes of the corporation . 
. . will be promoted thereby.”112 
The court concluded that the charity failed to satisfy both prongs of the 
statutory test.113  Under the first prong, the hospital’s board disregarded the value 
of the hospital’s ongoing operations and its name.114  Under the second prong, 
the board proposed “a fundamental change” and sought to devote corporate 
assets to “a new and fundamentally different corporate purpose.”115 
In prefacing its analysis of each statutory prong, the court embraced the duty 
of obedience in no uncertain terms116 and interpreted the statute through the lens 
of the duty of obedience.117  Recognizing that, under some circumstances, a 
board may properly abandon “the organization’s mission by selling its assets and 
then undertaking a new mission,”118 the court opined that one should direct 
attention to “the duty of obedience, which mandates that a Board, in the first 
instance, seek to preserve its original mission.”119  The court further explained 
that initiating “a course of conduct which turns it away from the charity’s central 
and well-understood mission should be a carefully chosen option of last 
resort.”120  Otherwise, in the face of financial difficulties, a board might choose 
to sell the nonprofit’s assets and modify its mission, “rather than taking all 
                                                 
 109. 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577–78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
 110. Id. at 584. 
 111. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a) (McKinney 2005). 
 112. Id. § 511(a)(6). 
 113. Manhattan Eye, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 597. 
 114. Id. at 594. 
 115. Id. at 594–95. 
 116. See id. at 593 (“It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to 
ensure that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out.  This duty has been referred to 
as the ‘duty of obedience.’  It requires the director of a not-for-profit corporation to ‘be faithful to 
the purposes and goals of the organization,’ since ‘[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate 
objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives: 
perpetuation of particular activities are central to the raison d’etre of the organization.’ . . .  [T]he 
duty of obedience, perforce, must inform the question of whether a proposed transaction to sell all 
or substantially all of a charity’s assets promotes the purposes of the charitable corporation when 
analyzed under section 511.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 595. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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reasonable efforts to preserve the mission which has been the object of its 
stewardship.”121 
Although Manhattan Eye certainly supports the static charter fidelity norm, 
its usefulness in jurisdictions outside New York is questionable.  Manhattan Eye 
involved a transaction governed by a specific statutory section requiring judicial 
approval of a charity’s plan to sell a substantial portion of its assets.122  The 
statute expressly required the charity to establish that the terms of the proposed 
sale would promote “the purposes of the corporation,”123 which may well refer 
to its historic charter purposes.124  The court’s ode to a “duty of obedience” was 
unnecessary, given this explicit statutory language. 
Another case commanding scholarly attention125 is Attorney General v. 
Hahnemann Hospital.126  In Hahnemann Hospital, a nonprofit charity operating 
a hospital sought judicial blessing127 of its proposed sale of hospital assets and 
its subsequent operation as a grant-making charity.128  The court in Hahnemann 
Hospital applied the dynamic charter fidelity norm in one context and the static 
charter fidelity norm in another.  First, the court held that the corporate charity’s 
board did not violate any fiduciary duty “merely by amending the articles of 
                                                 
 121. Id.  According to the court, the facts demonstrated that the hospital’s board had failed to 
make “a reasoned and studied determination that there was a lack of need” for the hospital, “or that 
the financial difficulties made it impossible to ensure the survival” of hospital operations.  Id.  The 
court noted that it was clear that the desire to sell hospital assets drove the change in the charity’s 
purposes.  Id. at 596.  Hence, the court determined that the hospital had not made “a showing that 
the sale will promote the purposes of the corporation,” and declined to approve the sale.  Id. at 597. 
 122. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a)(6) (McKinney 2005).  However, other 
state statutes do not even expressly require judicial approval of a sale of substantially all of a 
charity’s assets.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.§ 22.252 (West 2012) (allowing  the sale 
of all of a corporation’s  assets by a vote of its directors or  members with voting rights). 
 123. N. Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a)(6). 
 124. The statutory prong requiring that a sale promote the purposes of the corporation would 
add little to the law if the “purposes” are merely whatever the charity’s board chooses them to be 
immediately prior to filing the petition. 
 125. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 14, at 81 n.159; Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1467 
& n.310; Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing 
the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 999 n.141 (2010). 
 126. 494 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. 1986). 
 127. Because the charity and the intended purchaser of the hospital conditioned the sale upon 
obtaining the approval of the Massachusetts Attorney General and a court, the court declined to 
decide whether, in the acknowledged absence of a statutory provision on point, judicial approval 
of the sale would be required.  Id. at 1017.  However, the court did state that the parties’ assumption 
that judicial approval was required “may be correct.”  Id. 
 128. Id. at 1013–14.  The factual posture of the case is unusual, for the charitable nonprofit 
corporation received a great deal of its funding from a charitable trust, the terms of the governing 
instrument of which were incorporated by reference in the charitable corporation’s bylaws.  
Nonetheless, the rationale of Hahnemann Hospital conceivably extends well beyond those facts.  
Id. 
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organization to provide for the possibility of a sale of all assets.”129  Thus, the 
court applied the dynamic charter fidelity norm in the context of deciding 
whether charter amendments may be formally adopted. 
More interesting, though, is the court’s analysis of the effect of the 
amendments to charter purposes on assets held before and after the amendment.  
Two of the amendments were consistent with the terms of the governing 
instrument of an affiliated charitable trust, whose terms were incorporated by 
reference into the charitable corporation’s bylaws when the trust originally 
funded the corporation.130  Because donors were on notice under the 
corporation’s bylaws that its purposes could be expanded to include additional 
purposes for which the affiliated trust was organized, and further because two 
amendments to the charter conformed to trust purposes, the court found that 
these amendments were consistent with the terms of trust,131 and thus, 
presumably, pre-amendment donations could be devoted to further such 
purposes.132  However, because the third amendment to charter purposes 
(which broadly authorized the corporation to promote the health of the general 
public) exceeded the purposes of the affiliated trust, the court held that the board 
“will violate their fiduciary duties to those donors if they apply to the third, new 
purpose any proceeds of the sale attributable to donations from  
the . . . trust and from unrestricted donations made” before the amendment.133  
Just as intriguing is the dicta with which the court concluded its opinion: 
[W]e take this opportunity to comment on Hahnemann’s argument 
that, because under . . . [state statutory law] it may amend its purposes 
to include any charitable purpose, it may apply its unrestricted funds 
to any charitable purpose which, by amendment, it includes in its 
charter.  Hahnemann’s reading of . . . [state statutory law] would, in 
effect, grant to charitable corporations unfettered discretion to apply 
funds to any charitable purpose.  By simply amending its charter 
purposes, a charitable corporation would itself be able to exercise the 
power to devote funds to new charitable purposes whenever the 
trustees decided to do so, without any requirement that the new 
purposes be similar and not contradictory.  The public could not be 
assured that funds it donated would be used for similar public 
charitable purposes. . . .  Further, the corporation would be able to 
evade dissolution by reconstituting itself and directing all funds to its 
newly stated purposes.  Such an interpretation also might eviscerate 
the Attorney General’s power and responsibility to “enforce the due 
                                                 
 129. Id. at 1018.  The court also held that, in amending its corporate purposes to sell its historic 
(i.e., hospital) assets and then become a grant-making institution, the charity’s board had not 
violated a fiduciary duty to wind up its affairs in accordance with the state statute.  Id. at 1019–20. 
 130. Id. at 1020–21. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1021. 
 133. Id. 
2013] Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and the Duty of Obedience 939 
application of [charitable] funds . . . and prevent breaches of trust in 
the administration thereof.”134 
This cautionary dicta of Hahnemann Hospital strongly suggests that the court 
broadly embraced the static charter fidelity norm as applied to the management 
of assets held prior to a charter amendment—at least when there is no provision 
in the governing instrument specifically notifying donors that their donations 
can be used to advance amended purposes. 
A third case of scholarly note is Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, which 
concerned a nonprofit corporation (Queen) that had operated a hospital since its 
formation in 1927.135  Five years later, it added a wing that housed a clinic, which 
was later operated by an order of Franciscan sisters supervised by Queen’s 
medical staff.136  In 1971, Queen’s board of directors approved a lease of the 
hospital facilities (except for the outpatient clinic and a convent house) to a for-
profit company.137  Queen proposed to devote a substantial portion of rental 
receipts to establish and operate additional medical clinics for the poor.138  
Opposing the deal, California’s Attorney General argued “that under its articles 
of incorporation, Queen held its assets in trust primarily for the purpose of 
operating a hospital, and the use of those assets exclusively for outpatient clinics 
would constitute an abandonment of Queen’s primary charitable purpose and a 
diversion of charitable trust assets.”139 
The court embraced the rule that “all the assets of a corporation organized 
solely for charitable purposes must be deemed to be impressed with a charitable 
trust by virtue of the express declaration of the corporation’s purposes,” 
notwithstanding that donors had not explicitly incorporated such purposes in gift 
instruments.140  The court then focused on the precise language of the nonprofit’s 
charter purposes.  It observed that the articles of incorporation named the entity 
as a “hospital” and that, although the articles referred to multiple purposes, “the 
framework of those multiple purposes is the operation of a hospital.”141  In 
summary, the court found that “[t]he articles of incorporation alone—without 
resort to additional evidence—compel the inference that although Queen is 
entitled to do many things besides operating a hospital, essential to all those 
                                                 
 134. Id. (internal footnote omitted). 
 135. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 38–39. 
 138. Id. at 39. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Pacific Home v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953)). 
 141. Id. at 40.  The articles of incorporation did not even mention clinics.  Id.  Moreover, 
although a clause of the charter referred broadly to “acts of Christian charity particularly among 
the sick and ailing,” the clause “conclude[d] with the conjunctive purpose, ‘to house and care’ for 
persons, suggesting a hospital facility.”  Id.  Other clauses also implied or referred to the existence 
of hospital operations.  Id. 
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other activities is the continued operation of a hospital.”142  In short, the court 
held that although Queen could use some of its assets to further non-hospital-
related purposes, it may not “cease to perform the primary purpose for which it 
was organized.”143 
Queen of Angels is consistent with older California cases144 that continue to 
influence some judges in other jurisdictions.145  Whether these cases remain 
controlling under California law has been questioned, insofar as they pre-date 
the 1980 enactment of California’s nonprofit corporation act.146  However, the 
California Attorney General continues to embrace the trust law analysis in these 
cases,147 as do some attorneys general in other states.148 
c.  Case Law Supporting the Dynamic Charter Fidelity Norm 
Consistent with the PLNO, and contrary to the approach of Manhattan Eye, 
Hahnemann Hospital, and Queen of Angels, some cases support or implicitly 
embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied to a charity’s  
post-amendment use of assets held prior to an amendment to its articles of 
incorporation.  For example, in Kansas East Conference of the United Methodist 
Church, Inc. v. Bethany Medical Center, Inc., a Methodist conference of 
churches (“the Conference”) sought a declaratory judgment and an order to 
                                                 
 142. Id.  The court then buttressed its reasoning by demonstrating that Queen had long operated 
a hospital and had held itself out to the public (i.e., governmental authorities and donors) as doing 
so.  Id. at 40–41. 
 143. Id. at 41. 
 144. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 938–39 (Cal. 
1964) (ruling that the complaint of the minority trustees of a charitable corporation stated a cause 
of action by alleging that the majority trustees sought to abandon the corporation’s historic, charter 
purpose to conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical college and to convert it into a school 
teaching allopathic medicine and surgery); In re Los Angeles Cnty. Pioneer Soc., 257 P.2d 1, 6 
(Cal. 1953) (quoting In re Clippinger’s Estate, 171 P.2d 567, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)) (“‘[A] 
devise to a society organized for a charitable purpose without a declaration of the use to which the 
gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the objects for which the organization was created.’”); 
Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that funds 
raised by a nonprofit corporation to benefit needy members of its controlling entity were “impressed 
with a trust for the exclusive benefit” of those members notwithstanding subsequent charter 
amendments). 
 145. See, e.g., Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 250 (S.D. 2003) (ruling that, if 
South Dakota’s Attorney General can demonstrate that amendments to the corporate charter of a 
hospital corporation’s predecessor affected nonmembers’ rights, “a constructive charitable trust 
may be imposed on those assets donated to the local facilities”).  The court noted that “[o]ther 
courts have held that an amendment of a nonprofit corporation’s bylaws for the purpose of changing 
the corporate purpose was an abuse of the charitable trust created in gifts given to the corporation 
prior to the amendment.”  Id. (citing Los Angeles Cnty. Pioneer Soc., 257 P.2d at  
7–8). 
 146. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 66. 
 147. For a discussion of this point, see Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1468 & n.311. 
 148. See, e.g., John W. Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney 
General, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 243, 272–73 (2004). 
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dissolve Bethany Medical Center, Inc. (“Bethany”) and distribute its assets to 
the Conference.149  Bethany held approximately $40–45 million in cash after it 
sold its hospital assets to a for-profit company.150  At the time of the litigation in 
question, Bethany’s articles of incorporation permitted its board to amend them, 
and stated that upon dissolution, Bethany’s net assets would be distributed to the 
Conference.151   The lower court refused to order that Bethany be dissolved, but 
it did issue a permanent injunction prohibiting Bethany from displacing the 
Conference as the recipient of the assets if Bethany was dissolved.152 
The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the Conference’s argument that 
charitable trust law, rather than the statutory language of the Kansas Corporation 
Code, should control the disposition of the case.153  The court dismissed the 
notion that the Conference functioned “as a trust settlor,” and emphatically 
concluded that “dissolution of Bethany is governed by the corporate statutes.”154  
Having rejected the application of trust law to the question of whether Bethany 
must be dissolved, the court then addressed the trial court’s injunction against 
amending Bethany’s articles so as to displace the Conference as the distributee 
of Bethany’s assets in the event of Bethany’s dissolution.155  Bethany argued 
that the court violated its due process rights by entering the injunction without 
any notice or hearing on the issue.156  Bethany’s argument required proof that it 
possessed a legally-protected interest which it could not be deprived of without 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.157  The Kansas Supreme Court accepted 
the argument that state nonprofit law created a property interest in Bethany,158 
and then linked its analysis rejecting the application of trust law to the question 
of the propriety of the lower court’s injunction.159  The court concluded that “the 
district court interfered in the internal affairs of Bethany by enjoining it from 
                                                 
 149. 969 P.2d 859, 860 (Kan. 1998). 
 150. Id. at 861. 
 151. Id. at 862. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 863. 
 154. Id. at 864. 
 155. Id. at 866–67. 
 156. Id. at 867. 
 157. See id. at 867 (noting that the due process rights of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
attach only to deprivation of life, liberty, or property). 
 158. Id. at 868. 
 159. See id. at 870 (“The resolution of Bethany’s cross-appeal [on the injunction] is affected 
by our decision in the direct appeal by the Conference. We have approved the district court’s refusal 
to dissolve Bethany, ruling that a corporation is a creation of statute and dissolution is controlled 
by the Kansas Corporation Code. Notwithstanding that ruling, the district court proceeded to 
control the future operation of Bethany by enjoining it from amending its articles of 
incorporation.”). 
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amending its articles of incorporation as to the distribution of its assets upon 
dissolution.”160  Issuing the injunction, therefore, denied Bethany due process.161 
Bethany Medical Center supports the dynamic charter fidelity norm in both 
its rationale and holding.  The case rejects the notion that charitable trust law 
trumps state nonprofit statutes that confer power to a governing board to amend 
an entity’s articles of incorporation and act accordingly.162  Although the court 
considered the issue in the context of preserving the right of directors to amend 
the entity’s dissolution clause (and thereby redirect the disposition of corporate 
assets upon dissolution) the rationale of the case would also apply to the right of 
directors to amend an entity’s purposes clause, and thereby redirect the use of 
corporate assets in daily operations.163 
Another case that broadly supports the dynamic charter fidelity norm is Dodge 
v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon Woman’s College.164  In this case, the plaintiffs 
brought suit to enjoin the Randolph-Macon Woman’s College (“the College”), 
a single-sex liberal arts college, from implementing its plan to become co-
educational.165  The College sought to amend its articles of incorporation to 
include men and women, and planned to sell assets, including its art collection, 
to finance campus alterations that would facilitate the transition to a co-
educational institution.166  The plaintiffs argued that the College is a charitable 
trust under state law, and that the assets of the College are held in trust in 
furtherance of the College’s charitable purposes as set forth in its articles of 
incorporation, as they existed when the College received the assets as gifts.167  
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cited a state statute characterizing the 
assets of a charitable corporation as being held in trust.168 
                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 863 (holding that the dissolution of the corporation is controlled by the Kansas 
Corporation Code, not charitable trust law). 
 163. The Kansas Supreme Court did not view this right of directors as unlimited, however.  
The court approvingly cited Croon v. Tanner, 229 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Kan. 1951), for the proposition 
that “only when the officers [of a corporation] are guilty of willful abuse of their 
discretionary power or of bad faith, neglect of duty, perversion of the corporate purpose, or when 
fraud or breach of trust are involved,” will courts interfere with the exercise of their judgment.  
Bethany Med. Ctr., 969 P.2d at 870.  Also noteworthy is that one of the lower court’s rulings, which 
was not contested on appeal, required Bethany to use the proceeds from the sale of hospital assets 
“to improv[e] the health of Wyandotte County citizens, particularly indigent ones.”  Id. at 862.  
Thus, the lower court fell short of fully embracing the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  Because this 
ruling was uncontested, however, the Kansas Supreme Court had no reason to address it. 
 164. 661 S.E.2d 805 (Va. 2008). 
 165. Id. at 806–07. 
 166. Id. at 807. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-507.1.A (2011) (“The assets of a charitable corporation 
incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia shall be deemed to be held in trust for the public 
for such purposes as are established by the governing documents of such charitable corporation, 
the gift or bequest made to such charitable corporation, or other applicable law. The Attorney 
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The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute 
in question “requires the application of trust law, rather than corporate law, to 
the College.”169  The Court explained that the plaintiffs’ theory “would 
transform all charitable Virginia nonstock corporations into charitable trusts” 
and would erroneously lead one to assume legislative intent to effect “a drastic 
change in Virginia’s established law.”170  According to the court, the statute 
“simply confers upon the Attorney General the authority to act on behalf of the 
public to protect the public’s interest in assets held by charitable 
corporations.”171  The statute does not, however, impose duties on charitable 
corporations,172 hence, directors of charitable corporations are subject to the 
same standards governing directors of all nonstock corporations under Virginia 
statutory and common law.173 
Dodge rejects the notion that a charitable corporation holds its assets in trust 
in any comprehensive or far-reaching sense, as well as the idea that directors of 
charitable corporations owe duties in addition to those owed generally by 
directors of nonprofit corporations.  Although the Virginia Supreme Court in 
Dodge did not consider the plaintiffs’ argument that the lower court erred by 
concluding that the doctrine of cy pres did not apply,174 the opinion’s rationale 
is consistent with the lower court’s ruling.175  By emphasizing that state 
nonprofit corporate law governs charitable corporations and their directors, 
Dodge strongly suggests that directors have the power to amend the charter 
purposes clauses of the corporations that they govern and deploy corporate 
assets to pursue those purposes.176 
Another case supporting the dynamic charter fidelity norm is City of Hughes 
Springs v. Hughes Springs Volunteer Ambulance Service, in which a nonprofit 
corporation, originally formed to operate an ambulance service, was impeded 
from performing its primary historical purpose by local law enforcement and the 
city council.177  The nonprofit corporation responded by amending its charter 
purposes “to provide various services to the community which relate to the 
                                                 
General shall have the same authority to act on behalf of the public with respect to such assets as 
he has with respect to assets held by unincorporated charitable trusts and other charitable entities, 
including the authority to seek such judicial relief as may be necessary to protect the public interest 
in such assets.”). 
 169. Dodge, 661 S.E.2d at 808. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 809. 
 172. Id.  The court observed that section 2.2-507.1.B of the Virginia Code states that the 
provision relied upon by the plaintiffs is not “intended to modify the standard of conduct applicable 
under existing law to the directors of charitable corporations.”  Id. 
 173. Id.  The court observed that Virginia’s trust code does not apply to the College.  Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 807 (noting that the circuit court also held that the Uniform Trust Code was 
inapplicable to the situation). 
 176. See id. at 808 (rejecting the contention that trust law applies to nonprofit corporations).   
 177. 223 S.W.3d 707, 711–12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
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health and safety of the citizens in the Hughes Springs area.”178  A member of 
the nonprofit corporation and the City of Hughes Springs petitioned the court to 
dissolve and liquidate the entity.179  They relied on a provision of the Texas 
Nonprofit Corporation Act180 that required a court to liquidate a nonprofit 
corporation if “the corporation is unable to carry out its purposes.”181 
The court held that the amendments were valid.182  In view of the propriety of 
the amended charter purposes, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not prove 
that the nonprofit was no longer able to carry out its purpose.183  In fact, the court 
held that the nonprofit “is able to carry out its purposes as amended.”184  In 
reaching its decision, the court rebuffed the member’s attempt to buttress her 
argument by claiming that the doctrine of cy pres required the liquidation of the 
corporation under the statutory provision at issue.185  Although it was not well 
explained in the opinion, the members apparently theorized that, because the 
original purpose of the charitable nonprofit had failed, the court’s act of 
liquidating the corporation under the authority of the statute would be consistent 
with the doctrine of cy pres, insofar as dissolution could effectuate devotion of 
corporate assets to a similar use.186  However, the court concluded that “[t]he 
doctrine of cy pres does not prohibit the [nonprofit] from amending its purpose 
or require the [nonprofit] to be dissolved.”187  Taking some license with the 
scope of the doctrine, the court asserted that “even if the [nonprofit] is a charity, 
its assets will be converted from one charitable purpose to another charitable 
purpose—consistent with the doctrine of cy pres.”188 
Although the Hughes Springs court could have better expressed the cy pres 
argument, the important point is that the court refused to apply trust law concepts 
to override the ability of a board of directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation 
to amend its articles in accordance with state statutory law and then use its assets 
to further post-amendment purposes.  The opinion rejects the static charter 
fidelity norm as applied to the use of corporate assets following an amendment 
to a charitable corporation’s purposes clause. 
                                                 
 178. Id. at 714. 
 179. Id. at 709. 
 180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-7.06 (West 2003).  The statute has since been 
amended and no longer exists.  Hughes Springs, 223 S.W.3d at 710 n.2. 
 181. Hughes Springs, 223 S.W.2d at 709–10 (quoting TEX. REV. CRIM. STAT. ANN. Art. 1396-
7.06 (West 2003) (repealed 2010)). 
 182. Id. at 715. 
 183. Id. at 716. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 715–16. 
 186. Under the nonprofit corporation’s original articles of incorporation, the City of Hughes 
Springs was the designated distributee of assets upon dissolution of the corporation.  Id. at 711. 
 187. Id. at 716. 
 188. Id. 
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4.  What Charter Fidelity Norm Governs the Distribution of Assets in 
Dissolution and Liquidation of a Charitable Nonprofit Corporation? 
A related issue is whether a charity desiring to terminate its existence may, 
pursuant to a plan of dissolution, transfer its assets to a charity with purposes 
dissimilar to those expressed in its charter.  Some state statutes require 
dissolving charities to distribute assets to organizations having charitable 
purposes similar to those of the dissolving entity.189  Other statutes provide 
simply that the corporation must distribute its assets to other tax-exempt 
charities or governmental bodies.190  If the state statute governing distributions 
in dissolution expressly requires the dissolving entity to transfer assets to other 
charities with purposes similar to the longstanding express purposes of the 
dissolving entity, the statute functionally embraces the static charter fidelity 
norm, at least in part.  If the state statute does not explicitly require a dissolving 
entity to distribute assets only to a charitable transferee with specific purposes 
similar to those of the transferor, a court may be asked to decide whether to 
employ common law trust concepts to compel such a result.191 
Blocker v. State illustrates this issue.192  In Blocker, the court held that the 
directors of a charitable corporation breached their fiduciary duties by 
attempting to distribute corporate assets in dissolution to a private estate in 
which several directors had a personal interest.193  Although the holding itself is 
unremarkable, its rationale is potentially far-reaching.  The court accepted the 
state’s argument that the charter of a charitable corporation constitutes a 
declaration of charitable trust.194  The court held that property transferred to a 
charitable corporation is “subject to implicit charitable or educational limitations 
defined by the donee’s organizational purpose and within the meaning of the 
statute, where no express limitation to the contrary is stated in the transfer.”195  
According to the court, property that could be traced to such assets was likewise 
held by the charity “subject to the limitations imposed on the corporation by the 
terms of its own articles of incorporation.”196  Under this theory, the court 
                                                 
 189. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-1403(b)(3) (2003) (requiring the assets to be transferred 
to an organization “engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving 
corporation”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1002-a(c)(1) (McKinney 2013) (same). 
 190. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.304(a)(2) (West 2012) (providing that the 
remaining assets of a nonprofit corporation be distributed to other tax-exempt organizations, unless 
the corporation’s certificate of formation has an alternate provision). 
 191. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 16, at 184–85 (explaining that, while some 
states have codified the cy pres principles, other states still allow common law to govern whether 
or not cy pres applies). 
 192. 718 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
 193. Id. at 415. 
 194. Id. at 416. 
 195. Id. at 415. 
 196. Id.; see also id. (“We hold that the real property and personalty were assets received and 
held by the corporation, whether from donation or purchase, subject to limitations permitting their 
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concluded that distributions in liquidation were governed by a statutory 
dissolution provision applicable to “[a]ssets received and held by the corporation 
subject to limitations permitting their use only for charitable, religious, 
eleemosynary, benevolent, educational or similar purposes.”197  The provision 
generally required a dissolving nonprofit corporation to transfer such assets upon 
dissolution to organizations engaged in activities substantially similar to those 
in which the dissolving entity had engaged.198 
Because the court in Blocker construed a statutory provision that has since 
been repealed, one could argue that the “statutory duty” that the provision 
created has vanished, and never even existed in other states with liberal 
provisions governing distributions in liquidation of a charitable nonprofit 
corporation.  However, Blocker conceptualized donations received by a 
corporation as restricted gifts in trust, restricted for the purposes of the donee at 
the time of the donation.199  Just as assets restricted by the terms of a gift 
instrument must be distributed in a manner consistent with the restriction when 
the donee dissolves, so might a court influenced by Blocker conclude that assets 
restricted by the terms of the donee’s charter (at the time of the donation) must 
be similarly distributed upon the donee’s dissolution, even if state statutory law 
permits distributions to any charitable corporation.  The question essentially 
requires a court to choose between the static charter fidelity norm and the 
dynamic charter fidelity norm.  Case law exists that supports each conflicting 
view.200 
C.  Mission Fidelity Norms 
There is less precedent that directly and clearly articulates the mission fidelity 
norms.  Mission fidelity norms have received at least modest judicial 
recognition, although it is difficult to discern their impact apart from charter 
fidelity norms.  The two types of norms are theoretically distinct because a 
charity’s mission (for example, operating an elementary school) may be more 
                                                 
use only for educational purposes, by reference to the stated purposes set forth in the articles of 
incorporation.”). 
 197. Id. at 412, 415 (quoting the then-existing Article 1396-6.02.A(3) of the Texas  
Non-Profit Corporation Act, which has since been repealed). 
 198. See id. (quoting Article 1396-6.02(a)(3) of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, which 
has since been repealed) (“Assets received and held by the corporation subject to limitations [on 
their use] . . . shall be transferred or conveyed to one or more domestic . . . corporations 
 . . . engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation.”). 
 199. See id. at 415 (“We further hold that the acceptance of [assets held by the corporation 
from donations] established a charitable trust for the declared purposes as effectively as though the 
assets had been accepted subject to an express limitation providing that the gift was held in trust 
solely for such charitable purposes.”). 
 200. At least one case decided after Blocker v. State undermines the application of trust law 
principles to Texas nonprofit corporations.  See City of Hughes Springs v. Hughes Springs 
Volunteer Ambulance Serv., Inc., 223 S.W.3d 707, 715–16 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to apply 
the trust law principle of cy pres to a nonprofit corporation in Texas). 
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specific than the purposes expressly articulated in the charity’s corporate charter 
(for example, advancing charitable and educational purposes). 
1.  Support for the Historic Mission Fidelity Norm 
A few cases arguably embrace the historic mission fidelity norm, most notably 
in cases where a board seeks to devote funds to purposes that deviate from an 
entity’s longstanding mission.201  For example, in Manhattan Eye, it was 
“axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure that the 
mission of the charitable corporation is carried out.”202  Further, the court opined 
that deviating “from the charity’s central and well-understood mission should be 
a carefully chosen option of last resort.”203  Taken at face value, these statements 
reflect adoption of the historic mission fidelity norm.  However, it is unclear 
whether the court assigned significance to the historic mission fidelity norm 
apart from the static charter fidelity norm.  In Manhattan Eye, the purposes 
clause of the charity’s articles of incorporation articulated its specific mission, a 
fact that did not escape the attention of the court.204 
Queen of Angels offers additional judicial support for historicm ission fidelity.  
After stating that the hospital’s articles of incorporation alone were sufficient to 
impress donations with a charitable trust, the court buttressed its conclusion with 
the observation that Queen had actually operated a hospital throughout its 
                                                 
 201. In addition to the case law discussed in the text, some state statutes advance, or at least 
tend to favor, the historic mission fidelity norm in the way that they regulate charitable hospital 
conversions.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5917(e) (West 2013) (listing as one of the factors that 
the Attorney General should consider in giving (or withholding) consent to a proposed hospital 
conversion whether “[t]he proposed use of the proceeds from the agreement or transaction is 
consistent with the charitable trust on which the assets are held by the health facility”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 31-7-406(9) (2012) (requiring that the state-mandated public hearing conducted by the 
Attorney General in connection with the acquisition of a nonprofit hospital address several factors, 
including “[w]hether any disposition proceeds will be used for appropriate charitable health care 
purposes consistent with the nonprofit corporation’s original purpose or for the support and 
promotion of health care in the affected community”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71 
-20, 108(8) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating that the Attorney General will approve the acquisition of a 
nonprofit hospital if doing so is in the public interest; the Attorney General should consider, among 
other factors, whether proceeds of the transaction are “used for appropriate charitable health care 
purposes consistent with the seller’s original purpose or for the support and promotion of health 
care in the affected community”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.14-7(c)(16) (2012) (requiring the 
Attorney General to review a proposed nonprofit hospital conversion and consider, among other 
factors, “[w]hether the proposed conversion results in an abandonment of the original purposes of 
the existing hospital or whether a resulting entity will depart from the traditional purposes and 
mission of the existing hospital such that a cy pres proceeding would be necessary”).  See generally 
Frost, supra note 8, at 953–57 (summarizing state laws governing charitable hospital conversions 
and stating that the statutes generally require a showing “that the proceeds will be applied to a 
charitable purpose that is generally consistent with the founder’s or donor’s intent”). 
 202. In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 
1999). 
 203. Id. at 595. 
 204. See id. (referring to the charity’s “mission, as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation”). 
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history, represented to governmental taxing authorities that it was a hospital, and 
solicited public donations for hospital purposes.205  The court concluded that 
Queen “was intended to and did operate a hospital and cannot, consistent with 
the trust imposed upon it, abandon the operation of the hospital business in favor 
of clinics.”206  Although this portion of the opinion was dictum, it reflects 
judicial acceptance of the historic mission fidelity norm as applied to the use of 
funds received and accumulated while the nonprofit was carrying out its 
traditional mission. 
2.  Support for the Dynamic Mission Fidelity Norm 
Not all cases support rigid adherence to a charitable corporation’s historic 
mission, however.  For example, Bethany Medical Center tends to reject the 
historic mission fidelity norm.  In Bethany Medical Center, the Conference 
argued that Bethany should be dissolved under state law because it had 
“contracted away its purpose” by selling hospital assets.207  The Kansas Supreme 
Court disagreed, reasoning that the sale did not devoid Bethany of purpose 
because operating a hospital was “only one of several health-care related 
purposes pursued by Bethany.”208 
Similarly, the court in Hughes Springs held that the doctrine of cy pres did not 
prohibit a nonprofit corporation originally formed to operate an ambulance 
service from amending its purposes so as “to provide various services to the 
community which relate to the health and safety of the citizens in the Hughes 
Springs area.”209  The court also refused to order dissolution of the corporation, 
for it was perfectly capable of fulfilling its amended purposes.210  By endorsing 
the legitimacy of the corporation’s use of assets to further its amended charter 
purposes, the court rejected both the static charter fidelity norm and the historic 
mission fidelity norm. 
Although these cases reject the historic mission fidelity norm, they do not 
necessarily embrace the dynamic mission fidelity norm.  Affirming the dynamic 
mission fidelity norm not only imposes an affirmative obligation to advance the 
charity’s specific mission upon charity fiduciaries, but also allows the governing 
                                                 
 205. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 206. Id. at 41.  Cf. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 938 (Cal. 
1964) (“Plaintiffs allege that defendant trustees threaten to divert the assets of COPS to purposes 
other than those for which it was organized and for which COPS has in the past solicited and 
received funds in trust.”). 
 207. Kan. E. Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Bethany Med. Ctr., Inc., 969 
P.2d 859, 864 (Kan. 1998). 
 208. Id. at 866. 
 209. City of Hughes Springs v. Hughes Springs Volunteer Ambulance Serv., 223 S.W.3d 707, 
714, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
 210. Id. at 714. 
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board to amend the mission.211  Some language in case law tends to support this 
approach,212 but it is unclear whether existing authorities actually impose an 
obligation on charity fiduciaries to advance a charitable mission that is more 
specific than its charter purpose.  Insofar as the PLNO recognizes both the utility 
of adopting mission statements and the need to evaluate grounds for altering a 
charity’s mission over time, it at least partially embraces the dynamic mission 
fidelity norm.213 
D.  The Charity Advancement Norm 
State law consistently supports the elementary charity advancement norm and 
its negative corollary.  That it does so follows from the fundamental nature of 
charitable nonprofit corporations and the statutes authorizing them.  Directors of 
a charitable nonprofit corporation must govern in a way that promotes 
compliance with the corporation’s charter.214  Accordingly, a nonprofit 
corporation organized for charitable purposes must advance “charitable,” as 
opposed to non-charitable, purposes.  Certainly, the typical nonprofit 
corporation statute authorizes a nonprofit corporation to have purposes broader 
than those that the law recognizes as “charitable.”215  However, because 
corporations organized for charitable purposes are typically incorporated under 
nonprofit corporation statutes that require compliance with charter purposes, it 
is accurate to state that a charity’s compliance with its charter requires that it 
serve a charitable purpose.  Thus, the essential structure of the statutory law of 
nonprofit charitable corporations is designed to promote the charity 
advancement norm and its negative corollary. 
E.  Summary 
State case law and statutes governing directors of nonprofit corporations 
clearly embrace the legality norm and the charity advancement norm, together 
with its negative corollary.  The status of other obedience norms governing 
charity fiduciaries varies among the states. 
                                                 
 211. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 8, at 904–05 (proposing a legal requirement that directors 
advance a charity’s mission, but arguing for a flexible requirement that allows directors to amend 
a charity’s purpose). 
 212. See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468–69 n.17 (Del. 1991) (noting the director’s 
duty to promote a charity’s mission and the Attorney General’s ability to challenge a board decision 
that is in direct conflict with a charity’s mission). 
 213. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 320(b) cmt. e. (recognizing 
the importance of developing a clear mission statement, but explaining that the board should be 
able to alter the mission statement when needed). 
 214. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 215. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5301(a) (West 1995) (allowing for the creation of a 
nonprofit corporation, and providing a non-exhaustive list of examples); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE 
ANN. § 22.051 (West 2012) (permitting the creation of a nonprofit corporation “for any lawful 
purpose”). 
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State laws embrace norms of charter fidelity, but they differ in whether they 
impose the static charter fidelity norm or the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  
Most states adopt the dynamic charter fidelity norm as applied solely to the 
formal ability of a governing board to amend the charity’s governing instrument.  
But in other contexts, in which the question involves the freedom of directors to 
direct corporate assets to uses that differ from historic corporate purposes, the 
states take drastically different approaches.  Some states rely on trust law 
principles and impose the static charter fidelity norm on directors, whereas 
others apply corporate law concepts broadly and hold directors to the dynamic 
charter fidelity norm.  In one state, different courts have embraced different 
norms. 
Whether states impose some form of the mission fidelity norm that is 
independent of a charter fidelity norm is debatable.  Some authorities appear to 
embrace the historic mission fidelity norm, but do so in contexts in which the 
norm largely coincides with the static charter fidelity norm.  Other judicial 
authorities reject the historic mission fidelity norm, but fall short of clearly 
embracing the dynamic mission fidelity norm. 
Reform efforts have not resolved the states’ differing approaches.  The 
RMNCA and the MNCA Third do not wrestle with the difficult issues raised by 
the choice of obedience norms.  The PLNO embraces the dynamic charter 
fidelity norm and offers some support for the dynamic mission fidelity norm.  
States have yet to look to the PLNO for guidance on these issues, however. 
This survey of the law of obedience norms governing charity fiduciaries 
suggests the importance of identifying the precise purposes that obedience 
norms serve.  Before one can determine “what” obedience norms should govern, 
one must ponder “why” we need them.    
IV.  THE PURPOSE OF OBEDIENCE NORMS 
The major justifications for obedience norms can be categorized as follows: 
(1) ensuring the presence of public benefit,216 (2) promoting equity,217 and  
(3) encouraging efficiency.218 
A.  Public Benefit 
Ensuring that charitable organizations benefit the public is the most basic  
 
purpose of obedience norms.219  In fact, the law defines a “charitable purpose” 
                                                 
 216. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 214 (noting that a “public benefit” is the “fundamental 
purpose” of obedience norms). 
 217. See id. at 215–16 (explaining that equity is another purpose of obedience norms). 
 218. See id. at 217–19 (suggesting that reliance-based and experience-based efficiency could 
also be purposes of obedience norms). 
 219. Id. at 214; cf. Fremont-Smith & Lever, supra note 8, at 717 (“[T]here is great merit in the 
common law regulatory scheme under which the state does not dictate the actions of fiduciaries, 
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as one that is beneficial to the public.220  To require fiduciaries to advance 
“charitable” purposes is therefore an attempt to promote public benefit.  Of 
course, requiring fiduciaries to advance charitable purposes (and not others) is 
the essence of the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary.  
Additionally, the legality norm generally complements the charity advancement 
norm by discouraging behavior deemed detrimental to the public.  Thus, the 
public benefit justification for obedience norms supports adoption of the charity 
advancement norm and its negative corollary, and supports imposition of the 
legality norm as well. 
A more difficult question is whether the public benefit justification supports 
the adoption of additional obedience norms.  Charter fidelity norms reinforce the 
charity advancement norm by reminding fiduciaries of the activities that they 
can and cannot cause their charities to undertake.  Although the charity 
advancement norm may be sufficient in theory to ensure that a charity produces 
public benefit,221 some form of charter fidelity norm is useful in prompting 
charity fiduciaries to adhere to the charity advancement norm.  A similar 
argument can be made in favor of the mission fidelity norm, because requiring 
governance in accordance with a mission focuses attention on advancing charity 
thoughtfully.  The dynamic fidelity norms would serve these functions just as 
well as the static norms, however. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that the public benefit justification requires adoption of 
any “static” obedience norm (static charter fidelity or historic mission fidelity).  
Substantive government approval of an entity’s choice of charitable purpose and 
mission is generally not required upon formation of a charitable entity.222  A 
plausible explanation for this reality is that the law recognizes that the choice of 
charitable purpose by private actors suffices to promote public benefit if it is 
assumed that pursuing any charitable purpose produces public benefit.  Why, 
then, should substantive, ex ante governmental approval be necessary to ensure 
the presence of public benefit when an entity’s governing board decides to alter 
charitable purpose or mission?  One can articulate (questionable) justifications 
grounded in equity and efficiency for such approval, but ensuring the presence 
of some public benefit does not seem a persuasive justification for either static 
norm. 
                                                 
but rather monitors them to assure continued dedication to public purposes.”); Sugin, supra note 8, 
at 913–18 (discussing the public interest in a charity’s fulfillment of its mission and discrediting a 
donor-centric approach to evaluating nonprofit fiduciary duties). 
 220. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(f) (2003) (stating that charitable trust 
purposes include “other purposes that are beneficial to the community”); id. cmt. a (“The common 
element of charitable purposes is that they are designed to accomplish objects that are beneficial to 
the community—i.e., to the public or indefinite members thereof—without also serving what 
amount to private trust purposes . . . .”). 
 221. Such sufficiency obviously depends upon whether pursuing the purposes that the law 
recognizes as “charitable” does, in fact, produce public benefit. 
 222. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 1.25(a) (3d ed. 2009) (stating that the 
Secretary of State is required to file articles of incorporation that conform to law). 
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B.  Equity 
Another possible justification for obedience norms is that they promote equity 
by protecting the reliance interests of donors, and perhaps other stakeholders.223  
The theory is that donors have donated funds to charitable entities under the 
assumption that the money will be used to perform the donee’s charitable 
purposes as they exist when the funds are received.224  To allow the charity to 
alter its purposes, or perhaps even mission, after receiving such donations is 
unfair to those donors because of their reliance on the then-existing 
purposes/mission of the donee.  This rationale appears to be a favorite of the 
courts and commentators embracing static obedience norms.225  However, the 
equity rationale has limited appeal in the case of charitable trusts, and 
considerably less persuasive force as applied to charitable nonprofit 
corporations.  Further, the reliance-based equity justification does not support 
all obedience norms equally, even in the case of charitable trusts. 
Because of long-standing legal deference to the terms of trusts in general226 
and the application of the doctrine of cy pres to charitable trusts,227 those who 
currently contribute to charitable trusts properly assume that the trust’s express 
charitable purposes will typically remain unchanged.  But this general 
observation justifies upholding donors’ reliance interests on equity grounds only 
for as long as the law continues to apply cy pres or some similar doctrine.  Were 
the law to change, those who subsequently donate to charitable trusts would lack 
a compelling reliance interest in static charter fidelity.228  Further, even under 
current law, those who donate to charitable trusts properly assume that the static 
charter fidelity norm applies only when the terms of trust do not authorize 
amendments by the trustees.  If the terms of trust provide a mechanism for the 
trustees to amend the trust terms without judicial proceedings, those terms 
                                                 
 223. Buckles, supra note 20, at 215. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hospital, 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (noting 
that, if the charity could freely amend its charter purpose, “[t]he public could not be assured that 
funds it donated would be used for similar public charitable purposes”); Queen of Angels Hosp. v. 
Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that Queen was bound to its purpose 
of operating a hospital because, among other reasons, it had solicited donations from the public for 
the hospital); Frost, supra note 8, at 944–45, 951 (arguing that donors would be unlikely to give 
without assurance that the funds would be used to further corporate purposes). 
 226. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 227. The general inability to amend the purposes of a charitable trust absent cy pres 
proceedings is longstanding.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003).  For 
a discussion of cy pres, see supra Part II.B.2. 
 228. Were the law to change, donors to charitable trusts would not have grounds for relying on 
defunct doctrine.  It is circular to argue that equity concerns justify continued imposition of the 
static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts merely because  
(1) donors assume the existence of the static charter fidelity norm; and (2) they do so because the 
law imposes it. 
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control.229  A donor who gives to a charitable trust that permits amendments to 
its purposes clause therefore has no strong reliance interest in the fixed terms of 
trust.230 
Moreover, even in the case of a charitable trust that does not provide for 
amendments by trustees, trust law does not support adoption of the historic 
mission fidelity norm.  The classic expression of the duty to obey terms of trust 
that the law imposes on trustees applies only with respect to the actual terms of 
trust.  An action in cy pres is necessary to alter charitable purposes only when 
administering the terms of trust becomes impossible, illegal, impracticable, or 
wasteful.231  The classic articulation of cy pres does not require trustees of 
charitable trusts to go to court to bless a new charitable mission that falls within 
the express charitable purposes of the trust.232  Hence, donors to a charitable trust 
have no strong reliance interest in any particular charitable mission of a trust 
when other charitable missions would also further express the trust’s purposes. 
Reliance-based equity offers an even less compelling justification for static 
obedience norms in the case of charitable corporations.  Nonprofit corporation 
statutes typically enable charter amendments without court approval,233 
immediately distinguishing them from charitable trusts, which are governed by 
default rules requiring court approval of amendments to a trust instrument.234  
Donors to charitable nonprofit corporations are on notice of these corporate 
laws.  It is plausible that the average donor would assume that static obedience 
norms do not govern directors of charitable nonprofit corporations, perhaps even 
as applied to their power to deploy existing assets to advance new charitable 
purposes.235  If donors do assume such flexibility, rejection of static obedience 
norms does not defeat their reliance interests. 
Moreover, if the law across the states consistently assumed contrary donor 
expectations, counsel to nonprofit charitable corporations could draft governing 
                                                 
 229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(1) (2003) (“[T]he trustee or beneficiaries of 
a trust have only such power to terminate the trust or to change its terms as is granted by the terms 
of the trust.”). 
 230. The sole “donor” of many charitable trusts is simply its settlor.  However, a founder who 
contemplates large scale future public support may still choose the charitable trust form of operating 
a charity.  Such a charity would have multiple donors. 
 231. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 232. Cf. SCOTT, supra note 89 (describing how difficult it can be for a court, in the context of 
charitable trusts, to apply cy pres to determine the alternate disposition a settlor would want); see 
also supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 77-79, 89 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 216 (“Because of these typically liberal statutory 
amendment procedures, and absent specific statutory directives to the contrary, donors may assume 
that a charitable corporation can use gifts unaccompanied by any explicit donor-imposed restriction 
or explicit charity-imposed limitations for any bona fide ‘charitable’ purpose.”)(footnote omitted)); 
cf. Brody, The Limits, supra note 8, at 1418 n.76 (observing that “a corporate charity might more 
easily change its purposes than a charitable trust”). 
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documents to undermine the basis for maintaining the assumption.236  Lawyers 
could draft broadly phrased purposes clauses in corporate charters so as to limit 
the constraining effect of the static charter fidelity norm.  They could also draft 
charter provisions explicitly stating that directors can deploy existing assets to 
advance newly amended charitable purposes.  Under these circumstances, 
donors presumed to be aware of these provisions would have no legitimate basis 
for believing that their donations will be used to further any particular charitable 
purpose or mission.  All of these charter provisions should be enforceable,237 
which would undermine the reliance-based equity argument used to justify static 
obedience norms. 
Furthermore, adopting the historic mission fidelity norm as applied to 
directors of nonprofit charitable corporations would be doctrinally suspect.  The 
historic mission fidelity norm traditionally has not been imposed on trustees of 
charitable trusts independently of the static charter fidelity norm.238  Declining 
to shackle trustees of charitable trusts with this norm while at the same time 
imposing it on directors of nonprofit corporations (who oversee a form of entity 
that, if anything, is usually thought to avoid some of the rigidities of the law of 
charitable trusts) creates incoherence.239  A possible response to this line of 
reasoning is that a single settlor of a charitable trust has only herself to blame 
for failing to articulate a precise charitable mission, whereas the multitudinous 
donors to a charitable corporation operating perpetually have no ability to draft 
charter purposes.  But this objection is largely illusory.  Rejecting the static 
charter fidelity norm and the historic mission fidelity norm in the case of 
charitable nonprofit corporations does not leave donors without protections 
analogous to those enjoyed by the settlor of a charitable trust.  Donors of 
charitable corporations are still free to protect their donations from diversion to 
an alternative charitable use in the future by explicitly restricting their gifts when 
                                                 
 236. Granted, funding realities may constrain this strategic behavior to some degree.  If a 
charity anticipated that drafting its corporate charter to maximize its flexibility in redeploying 
donations would dramatically curtail its current receipt of donations, it would likely exercise  
self-restraint in drafting charter terms.  See Gary, Trust Law, supra note 8, at 616 (“As a practical 
matter, to be able to attract future gifts from the same donors or from other donors, the charity must 
not stray far from its mission and must manage its assets effectively.”). 
 237. Cf. Denckla v. Indep. Found., 181 A.2d 78, 83 (Del. Ch. 1962) (“If the power to make the 
contested grant is either expressly or by necessary implication given by its charter then it matters 
not whether trust law or corporate law is applicable.”), aff’d, 193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963). 
 238. See supra Part I.D. (“[A] state that has adopted the static charter fidelity norm need not 
necessarily adopt the historic mission fidelity norm.”). 
 239. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 58–59 (“That corporate law governs directors’ 
fiduciary duties, but trust law would govern their power to manage charitable assets, makes little 
sense doctrinally or analytically.”). 
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made.240  The law generally honors such restrictions.241  Consequently, donors 
who wish to bind charitable donees to fulfill their expectations can do so. 
Additionally, rejecting the static obedience norms in the case of charitable 
corporations does not disregard donor expectations altogether.  It is possible to 
disfavor a system requiring ex ante, substantive governmental approval of a 
change in a charitable corporation’s purpose or mission while embracing a 
system that provides for meaningful ex post judicial review of fiduciary 
decisions to change purposes or mission.  A variety of approaches short of ex 
ante, substantive governmental approval would balance the reliance interest of 
donors and the desirability of vesting in nonprofit directors the primary 
responsibility for altering a charitable corporation’s course.242 
Finally, the basic charity advancement norm and its negative corollary protect 
the most compelling reliance interest of donors and other stakeholders.  
Although it is debatable whether a charitable corporation’s donors should 
assume that the donee will not unilaterally alter its charitable purposes or 
mission, donors surely are entitled to assume that the donee will not divert funds 
to a non-charitable purpose.  Such diversion would plainly violate donors’ 
expectations.  Fiduciaries who comply with the fundamental charity 
advancement norm and its negative corollary honor this reasonable expectation 
of donors.  Thus, once again, rejecting static obedience norms does not require 
rejecting all reliance interests of donors. 
C.  Efficiency 
One may also attempt to justify obedience norms on grounds of efficiency.243  
The charity advancement norm is limited in the degree to which it promotes 
efficiency because compliance with the norm merely means that fiduciaries are 
furthering some charitable purpose, not that they are doing so effectively.244  
                                                 
 240. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 898 (noting that those administering charities must administer 
their assets consistent with the donor’s stated wishes); see also Marion R.  
Fremond-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal 
Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 620–22 (2007) (discussing 
donors’ rights to enforce the terms of restricted gifts made to corporate charities). 
 241. See Sugin, supra note 8, at 914 (“Without additional legal protections, donors have 
tremendous power under contract law [to protect their interests], as they define the terms of their 
gifts.”). 
 242. See infra Part V (discussing several approaches). 
 243. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–19.  I previously articulated two versions of the 
efficiency argument: reliance-based efficiency and experience-based efficiency.  Because the latter 
version is quite weak for reasons already explained, I focus on the former version of the argument 
in this Article.  For a discussion (and rejection) of the possible efficiencies of trust law parallelism 
in the context of unrestricted charitable gifts to corporate charities, see Katz, supra note 8, at 717–
18. 
 244. This explains why the public benefit justification for obedience norms is distinct from the 
efficiency justification.  To claim that furthering charitable purposes produces a public benefit does 
not imply that advancing the precise charitable purposes in question maximizes public benefit.  This 
Article characterizes justifications for obedience norms that are articulated in terms of maximizing 
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Charter fidelity norms may promote efficiency by educating and reminding 
charity fiduciaries to adhere to the charity advancement norm and its negative 
corollary.  Moreover, requiring some form of mission fidelity  is also likely to 
be efficient, insofar as requiring governance in accordance with the charity’s 
mission encourages fiduciaries to deliberate and weigh possible goals and 
achievable outcomes, rather than merely supervise random acts of kindness.245  
However, the dynamic charter and mission fidelity norms would serve these 
functions just as well as the static norms.  Furthermore, there are valid reasons 
to believe that static obedience norms, on balance, are probably less efficient 
than dynamic norms in the case of charitable corporations.246 
Short-term efficiency is better served by imposing dynamic norms in some 
contexts.247  To illustrate, consider a cash-rich charity organized to fund the 
neutering of stray cats in Louisiana cities.  Assume a hurricane blasts through 
the Gulf of Mexico and leaves thousands homeless in New Orleans.  The social 
welfare produced by helping homeless human hurricane victims surely 
outweighs that of neutering the (now drastically diminished) feline population.  
However, the static charter fidelity norm and the historic mission fidelity norm 
would limit the charity’s ability to quickly alleviate widespread human suffering 
because of the inevitable delay caused by the requirement mandating that the 
charity obtain ex ante government approval of the change in charitable 
purpose.248 
The efficiency of requiring ex ante substantive governmental approval of 
changes in charter purpose and mission that are less time sensitive depends on 
many factors, including the out-of-pocket costs of such a system, the relative 
competence of charity fiduciaries and government agents in exercising 
judgment, and the long-term effect of the choice of the system on charitable 
donations.249 
The costs associated with the first factor, out-of-pocket costs of obtaining ex 
ante substantive governmental approval to change the charter purpose or 
mission, are likely higher than the costs of a system that does not require such 
                                                 
public benefit, or at least better enhancing public benefit than other norms, net of associated costs, 
as justifications grounded in efficiency. 
 245. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 84 (stating that “mission factors may help give 
content to the inchoate considerations that contribute to the board’s deliberation”); Sugin, supra 
note 8, at 921 (“This is how care and obedience come together—the board must exercise care in 
evaluating the charitable goals and effectiveness of the organization.”). 
 246. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217. 
 247. Cf. Atkinson, supra note 14, at 87 (arguing that freeing fiduciaries from the obligation to 
advance purposes favored by “dead donors” enables them to “respond to evolving social needs in 
a more efficient and creative fashion”); Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 8, at 960 (“Blind 
obedience to mission . . . can impede the rational use of nonprofit corporate assets.”). 
 248. Even adoption of the dynamic charter fidelity norm would delay the charity’s response 
time to a lesser degree. 
 249. For a preliminary assessment of the argument that efficiency is enhanced when donors 
can rely upon static fidelity norms, see Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–18. 
2013] Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and the Duty of Obedience 957 
approval.  Government actors will likely review fewer changes in a system that 
does not require ex ante substantive government approval.250    No credible 
argument can be made that requiring a governmental actor to review and 
evaluate every change in charter purpose or mission by every charity is cheap.  
Furthermore, other costs must be considered.  For example, nonprofits seeking 
to alter their charitable paths will incur advocacy costs. 
Concerning the second factor, there is no readily apparent reason to assume 
that charity fiduciaries are less able than government actors to decide upon the 
advisability of a change in purpose or mission.  First, government approval of 
an entity’s choice of charitable purpose and mission is generally not required 
when forming a charitable entity or drafting its initial mission statement.  If the 
law assumes that private actors can be entrusted with the choice of an entity’s 
original charitable purpose and mission, why should the law not assume likewise 
when fiduciaries decide upon a new charitable direction?  In addition, the law 
generally assumes that charity fiduciaries are competent to make decisions.  A 
governing board is not usually required to seek advance state approval to enlarge 
its facilities, double its workforce, expand its customer base, relocate, obtain a 
loan, or radically alter its investment portfolio.251  If fiduciaries are assumed to 
be capable of making these changes, why should the law not assume that they 
are also capable of deciding upon changes in purpose and mission?  Third, it 
may be assumed that those most familiar with the past and present operations of 
a charity are in the best position to evaluate the merits of a change in the charity’s 
direction.  Indeed, the ability of a board to manage a charity largely free from 
governmental meddling is a hallmark of the nonprofit sector.252  If a governing 
board keeps itself informed as required by the duty of care,253 the board is 
probably at least as familiar with its operations as is a government actor, whose 
knowledge of the entity may be short-lived and limited to the contents of a file 
that is but one of hundreds the actor is responsible for reviewing.254  Further, 
                                                 
 250. There is a plausible system of ex post review of charter and mission changes by 
government actors that is just as comprehensive and costly as one requiring ex ante review of such 
changes.  However, such attributes of a system providing for ex post review of fiduciary decisions 
seem improbable.  In a system requiring ex ante approval, every change in the purposes or mission 
of every charity theoretically requires governmental review and an assessment of its merits.  In a 
system of ex post review, a governmental actor, such as a state attorney general, would be expected 
to focus attention on changes in purpose or mission that seem most problematic. 
 251. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5210 (West 2013) (stating that all powers of a nonprofit 
corporation must be “exercised by or under the direction of the board [of directors]”); TEX BUS. 
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.201 (West 2012) (stating that the board of directors manages a nonprofit 
corporation’s affairs). 
 252. Fremont-Smith, supra note 16, at 1–2.  Cf. Reiser, supra note 47, at 14 (“[R]eliance on 
public enforcement of charitable mission would seriously threaten charitable autonomy and perhaps 
infringe on associational rights.”). 
 253. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT. § 8.30(a) cmt. 2 (1987) (explaining 
that pursuant to their duty of care, directors must act with “informed judgment”). 
 254. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 8, at 976 (“The courts . . . have no particular 
familiarity, much less expertise, with the charity’s operating needs.”); id. at 977 (“[S]tate attorneys 
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government actors who serve limited terms in positions that render them directly 
or indirectly accountable to the electorate (especially state attorneys general) 
may adhere to a concept of “public benefit” that is more parochial, and therefore 
less objective, than that of charity fiduciaries.255 
With respect to the third factor, the long-term effect of the choice of the 
system on charitable donations, a distinction between charitable trusts and 
charitable corporations is once again apropos.256  A single settlor of a charitable 
trust may choose the trust form to maximize the probability that her charitable 
preferences will be honored in perpetuity.257  Without meaningful assurances 
that the static charter fidelity norm will broadly apply over time, some 
prospective settlors may simply decide not to fund charitable trusts.  For the 
class of such settlors, generally imposing the static charter fidelity norm on 
trustees may increase efficiency by encouraging the initial funding of charitable 
trusts.258 
Similarly, with respect to nonprofit charitable corporations, people may 
decrease their donations to corporate charities if they can alter their charitable 
purposes and use donations to advance new causes that donors did not initially 
intend to support.259  Without assurances that donations will be spent as 
contemplated by donors, some donors may not subsidize worthy projects as 
extensively as they otherwise would.260  The reduction in donations is inefficient 
because it results in an undersupply of those charitable goods deemed most 
efficient by the market for donations.  However, this efficiency argument is far 
from convincing.261  In brief, (1) it is unclear that those who donate to charitable 
nonprofit corporations really assume or prefer the existence of static fiduciary 
                                                 
general have no necessary expertise, much less the resources, to address the myriad concerns of the 
hundreds of thousands of charities that function in the United States today.”). 
 255. See id. at 939 (“When faced with the flight or loss of significant nonprofit assets from a 
locality, state regulators, courts, and the legislature sometimes mobilize to secure the border.”).  Cf. 
Atkinson, supra note 14, at 95 (arguing that elected public officials may cater to powerful political 
constituencies, rather than those most deserving of charitable funds); Brody, Whose Public?, supra 
note 8, at 947–48 (observing the political realities facing elected attorneys general). 
 256. See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466–67 (Del. 1991) (contrasting the probable 
expectations of the settlor of a charitable trust and the founder of a charitable corporation). 
 257. Cf. Manne, supra note 8, at 271 (arguing that upholding a founder’s intent encourages the 
formation and funding of charities). 
 258. This observation does not imply that, on balance, imposing the static charter fidelity norm 
on trustees of charitable trusts necessarily is efficient given the costs of doing so.  Instead, it simply 
acknowledges the plausibility of the position that applying the static charter fidelity norm to trustees 
of charitable trusts likely encourages some settlors to give. 
 259. For an initial exposition and preliminary response to this argument, see Buckles, supra 
note 20, at 217–18. 
 260. Frost, supra note 8, at 951. 
 261. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 217–18 (criticizing the reliance-based efficiency 
justification for obedience norms). 
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obedience norms;262 (2) the costs of a system requiring ex ante, substantive 
government approval of purpose/mission changes may outweigh the benefits of 
such a system, not only in fact, but also as perceived by donors; and (3) donors 
who desire to protect themselves against redirection of charitable donations can 
do so by restricting their charitable gifts.263  On balance, the static obedience 
norms are not easily justified on grounds of efficiency in the case of charitable 
corporations. 
D.  Summary 
Ensuring at least some public benefit is the most justifiable purpose of 
fiduciary obedience norms.  The charity advancement norm and its negative 
corollary—and generally the legality norm—plainly serve this purpose and 
should apply to all charity fiduciaries.  Reliance-based equity may also justify 
certain obedience norms, most clearly the charity advancement norm and its 
negative corollary.  Equity concerns probably do not justify any static obedience 
norm as applied to the management of unrestricted gifts to charitable 
corporations.  Similarly, although imposing some form of charter fidelity and 
mission fidelity norms may promote efficiency, it is doubtful that applying static 
obedience norms to directors of nonprofit charitable corporations does so.  The 
dynamic charter fidelity and dynamic mission fidelity norms, however, should 
apply to these directors.  Efficiency justifications may or may not support 
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts,264 but 
there is no obvious reason to bind them to the historic mission fidelity norm 
when trust purposes are broadly phrased.  Nonetheless, if a charitable trust has 
broadly phrased purposes, holding its trustees to the dynamic mission fidelity 
norm would likely enhance efficiency. 
V.  IMPLEMENTING FIDUCIARY OBEDIENCE NORMS 
Evaluating the possible purposes of obedience norms informs the 
determination of what norms should apply to whom.  With the conclusions of 
Part IV in mind, the legal analyst is poised to ask a series of questions ultimately 
designed to help judges and legislators formulate a cogent legal framework for 
implementing fiduciary obedience norms.  Articulating these distinct questions 
not only aids the analysis, but may also help establish common ground among 
courts and commentators that currently hold divergent views. 
The following questions should be answered in crafting an approach for 
imposing obedience norms on charity fiduciaries: 
                                                 
 262. See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 81 (stating that donors to charitable corporations may 
prefer “fiduciary freedom to change purposes,” or at least harbor indifference to such freedom). 
 263. See Buckles, supra note 20, at 218. 
 264. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting that the equity justification for 
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts would vanish should the 
law abandon the traditional doctrine of cy pres and decline to replace it with some similar 
alternative). 
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(1) Should charity fiduciaries have the power to alter a charity’s 
purposes or mission (and devote assets accordingly) without obtaining 
ex ante, substantive governmental approval of the change? 
(2) If charity fiduciaries should have the power to alter a charity’s 
purposes or mission (and devote assets accordingly) without obtaining 
ex ante, substantive governmental approval of the change, should their 
exercise of discretion nonetheless be subject to governmental review? 
(3) If the decision by charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes 
or mission (and devote assets accordingly) is reviewable either ex ante 
or ex post, how much deference should a reviewing governmental 
agent extend to charity fiduciaries? 
(4) If the decision by charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes 
or mission (and devote assets accordingly) is reviewable either ex ante 
or ex post, what grounds justify the decision of charity fiduciaries to 
change a charity’s purposes/mission? 
Concerning the first question, the analysis of Part IV of this Article suggests 
the propriety of maintaining a distinction between charitable corporations and 
charitable trusts.265  Part IV supports the view that directors of charitable 
nonprofit corporations should not be governed by static fiduciary obedience 
norms (except with respect to restricted gifts).266  As applied to corporate 
fiduciaries, the public benefit, equity, and efficiency arguments probably do not 
justify the static norms.  In the case of trustees of charitable trusts,  
reliance-based efficiency concerns may support imposition of the static charter 
fidelity norm, but neither equity nor efficiency considerations justify applying 
the historic mission fidelity norm as an independent constraint. 
At this point, those who have argued for imposing static fiduciary obedience 
norms on all charity fiduciaries may take heart that rejecting certain static 
obedience norms does not end the relevant inquiries.  To  conclude that directors 
of charitable corporations should have the power to alter a charity’s purposes 
and mission, and to devote corporate assets accordingly, does not establish that 
doing so is a proper exercise of fiduciary discretion in any given case.267  
Similarly, that trustees of charitable trusts with broad purposes clauses should 
have the power to alter their charitable missions does not mean that every 
mission change that falls within such purposes is prudent.  Although in each case 
fiduciaries should have the power to change charitable paths without first 
obtaining governmental blessing for their decisions, their exercise of discretion 
                                                 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 302–04. 
 266. Thus, the analysis generally favors the approach taken by the PLNO and the court in 
Bethany Medical Center Inc., rather than the approach taken by the court in Manhattan Eye.  
Compare supra Part III.B.3.c., with supra Part III.B.3.b. 
 267. Consider the following analogy to the management of an investment portfolio: that a 
board of directors has the power to authorize charity officers to invest in a hedge fund does not 
mean that it is prudent for the board to do so every time a hedge fund promoter pitches an 
investment to the charity.  Power must not be confused with prudence. 
2013] Charitable Nonprofit Organizations and the Duty of Obedience 961 
nonetheless should be subject to governmental review, most logically, judicial 
review.268  Doing so treats their decisions regarding purposes and mission 
similarly to how the law treats other decisions that they make.  Although the 
primary responsibility for adopting and amending charitable goals rests with 
charity fiduciaries, they should not be free to act irresponsibly in overseeing a 
change in a charity’s purposes and mission, just as they are not free to act 
irresponsibly in overseeing a change in the charity’s pool of investments or 
employees.  An attorney general should be able to question a decision to alter 
charitable purposes and mission, once made, just as she may question other 
decisions of charity fiduciaries. 
Ultimately, two questions persist.  The primary purpose of articulating these 
last two questions is not to answer them here, but to suggest how courts and state 
legislatures should think through the issues in order to answer them.  As to the 
penultimate question, those convinced that charity directors and trustees are 
uniquely well suited to assess the merits of changes in purposes and mission may 
favor one of two standards of judicial review.  One standard would accord 
heightened deference to charity managers,perhaps by authorizing courts to find 
a violation of fiduciary duty only when managers have acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously.  Those who see no real difference between a fiduciary’s judgment 
concerning charitable purposes and mission and that concerning any other matter 
may favor another approach to judicial review, one that evaluates all 
disinterested exercises of fiduciary discretion under the same standard.269  Those 
who desire heightened protection of the reliance interests of donors and other 
stakeholders might favor a standard of judicial review that places an affirmative 
burden on charity fiduciaries to establish the justification for a change in 
purposes or mission.270 
Although the issue of what standard of judicial review should apply in these 
cases is theoretically distinct from the issue of whether such review should be 
ex ante or ex post, a standard of judicial review that accords some deference to 
the judgment of fiduciaries appears to be consistent with the assumptions that 
                                                 
 268. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 84 (advocating for the imposition of a duty on 
directors of charitable corporations to consider charitable mission, subject to deferential judicial 
review). 
 269. Most decisions of directors of incorporated charities are subject to the business judgment 
rule.  See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 365 (explaining the business 
judgment rule); Goldschmid, supra note 8, at 644 & n.76 (citing cases that have applied the business 
judgment rule to directors’ decisions). 
 270. Additional protection of donors’ reliance interests could take the form of requiring a 
charitable corporation to notify the state attorney general of a proposed charter amendment or other 
significant change.  The attorney general could then petition a court for an injunction if he or she 
believes the change is improper.  Such an approach approximates adoption of the static or historic 
fidelity norms, insofar as a governmental actor (the state attorney general) functionally has the 
power through adjudication to ensure that a change will become effective only if another 
governmental actor,a court,permits it.  Some states essentially follow this approach in certain 
contexts.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5913 (West 2013) (requiring notice to the Attorney General 
before a public benefit corporation disposes of substantially all of its assets). 
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would lead one to favor dynamic obedience norms over static norms.271  The 
argument for applying dynamic obedience norms to directors of charitable 
corporations ultimately implies that charitable boards are better suited than 
courts and attorneys general to monitor and redirect charitable paths.  If that 
premise is correct, some degree of judicial deference to the decisions of directors 
is warranted. 
Concerning the final question, state law should articulate the grounds that 
justify the decision of charity fiduciaries to change a charity’s purposes and 
mission, regardless of the standard of judicial review that is applied or whether 
such review is performed ex ante or ex post.  The choice of grounds for justifying 
a change in purposes and mission is theoretically distinct from the decision of 
whether to implement ex ante or ex post judicial review of the change.  
Nonetheless, the two issues are intertwined.  Those who favor static norms will 
likely desire to limit the grounds for changing a charity’s purposes and 
mission,272 whereas those who favor dynamic norms will likely advocate for 
broader grounds justifying change.273 
To illustrate, the doctrine of cy pres, which governs charitable trusts, 
embraces quite narrow grounds for changing charitable purposes,274 an 
unsurprising reality if one observes that the static charter fidelity norm governs 
charitable trusts.275  But if one is persuaded by the argument of Part IV that 
dynamic obedience norms should govern directors of charitable corporations, 
one should embrace a broader set of grounds for altering a corporate charity’s 
purposes and mission and consequent deployment of assets than those 
recognized by the doctrine of cy pres.  Relevant facts include (1) inefficiencies 
in maintaining the status quo (high operating costs, difficulty in retaining 
competent personnel, inability to maintain adequate facilities, etc.); (2) the 
ability of other institutions (government, nonprofits, and for-profit firms) to 
serve the community previously served by the charity desiring to change course; 
                                                 
 271. Cf. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 83 (proposing that directors “enjoy presumptive 
deference in defining and, within limits, amending” charitable mission); Sugin, supra note 8, at 921 
(arguing in favor of a concept of dynamic mission fidelity under which “judicial review [is] highly 
deferential to the reasoned decisions of charity boards”). 
 272. The grounds inhering in the “quasi-cy pres” approach applicable to dissolving New York 
charitable corporations provide an example.  See, e.g.,  In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org. of N.Y., 
Inc., 496 N.E.2d 861, 864 (N.Y. 1986) (reversing an intermediate appellate court that permitted a 
dissolving charitable corporation to donate part of its assets to another charity that did not meet 
New York’s statutory requirements). 
 273. See, e.g., Greaney & Boozang, supra note 8, at 83–84 (listing relevant mission-related 
factors); Sugin, supra note 8, at 921 (“Obedience as fidelity empowers boards to exercise their 
judgment in the name of mission by allowing them to depart from business law constraints.”). 
 274. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 275. This observation does not imply that existing charitable trust law strikes the optimal 
balance between honoring donors’ reliance interests and enabling trustees to manage charitable 
trusts efficiently.  The law could still protect the reliance interests of donors to some degree by 
coupling ex ante judicial review of proposed amendments to a trust instrument with expanded 
grounds for changing charitable purposes. 
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(3) the importance of the needs that would be met with the change in purpose 
relative to the needs currently being met; (4) the ability of other institutions to 
meet the needs that would be addressed with the change in purpose; and (5) the 
efficiency with which the charity could pursue the new purpose.276 
Although these factors bear upon the reasonableness of a decision to change 
a charity’s purposes, it is most important to emphasize (1) that the law must be 
clear, so that both fiduciaries and governmental actors know what is expected of 
charity fiduciaries, and (2) that the adoption of dynamic obedience norms 
suggests a measure of confidence in the decision-making capacity of 
fiduciaries,confidence that implies their ability to evaluate all of the relevant 
facts.  Courts and legislatures should keep these points in mind as they impose 
obedience norms on charity fiduciaries. 
VI.  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The law of obedience norms governing charity fiduciaries is far from settled 
and coherent.  State laws embrace the legality norm and the charity advancement 
norm, and some form of charter fidelity norm.  The static charter fidelity norm 
governs charitable trusts by default.  Many states appear to accept the dynamic 
charter fidelity norm as applied strictly to the formal requirements for amending 
a charitable corporation’s articles of incorporation.  However, states differ in the 
constraints that they impose on corporate directors seeking to deploy charitable 
assets for purposes other than those traditionally served by their charities.  Some 
states clearly implement the static charter fidelity norm in these contexts, 
whereas others favor the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  The law is ordinarily 
unclear as to whether charity fiduciaries must advance a charitable mission more 
specific than its charter purpose(s). 
An analysis of the potential justifications for obedience norms affirms the 
legitimacy of the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary, as well 
as (in general) the legality norm.  The efficiency justifications for broadly 
imposing the static charter fidelity norm on trustees of charitable trusts are 
plausible, though not definitive.  However, dynamic charter fidelity norms 
should apply to directors of charitable corporations.  The historic mission fidelity 
norm, as a norm independent of charter fidelity, should not apply to charity 
fiduciaries.  Rather, imposing the dynamic mission fidelity norm on all charity 
fiduciaries, both directors and trustees, is sensible. 
Deciding what norms should govern which charity fiduciaries does not 
complete the necessary analysis.  States must also decide the degree of deference 
that courts should extend to the decisions of charity fiduciaries, and must 
determine the grounds that justify a decision by charity fiduciaries to change a 
charity’s purposes and mission.  This Article suggests how states should 
approach these design questions. 
                                                 
 276. This list is not exhaustive, but is representative of the factors that boards should consider 
when deciding upon a change in charitable purpose and mission. 
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This Article does not focus on whether the law’s implementation of obedience 
norms should occur through imposition of a “duty of obedience” on directors of 
charitable nonprofit corporations, in addition to the duties of care and loyalty.  
Nevertheless, this Article’s analysis suggests that the tentative draft of the PLNO 
strikes the proper balance by recognizing the legitimacy of certain obedience 
norms, yet declining to articulate a distinct “duty of obedience” governing 
charity fiduciaries.  The dynamic charter fidelity norm and the dynamic mission 
fidelity norm are best implemented in a system that confers on charity fiduciaries 
both primary responsibility for forging a charity’s path and discretion in how 
best to do so.  The twin fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, exercised in good 
faith, provide sufficient standards for evaluating directors’ decisions under such 
a system.  To impose an additional “duty of obedience” on directors arguably 
implies that decisions concerning mission and purpose are somehow much 
different from other exercises of discretion.  It is doubtful that they are, and 
therefore the more traditional expression of fiduciary duties should be favored. 
